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WHO NEEDS ADVERSE POSSESSION? 
Nadav Shoked* 
 
Adverse possession is one of property law’s most central doctrines.  Yet, 
this Article contends, the need it answers has been largely misunderstood.  
Adverse possession’s doctrinal effects are clear—and stark:  when its 
requirements are met, an owner loses her land to an invader.  To explain a 
doctrine instituting such a radical result, scholars resort to property law’s 
major philosophical theories.  These theories, they argue, at times demand 
that an owner lose her land to another person who is more committed to that 
land.  The problem with these prevailing justifications of adverse possession, 
this Article shows, is that they imagine a very specific case of adverse 
possession:  a squatter putting invaded land to a meaningful use.  In reality, 
however, very few adverse possession cases nowadays involve homesteading 
squatters.  Instead, most consist of neighbors bickering over the boundary 
separating their lots.  Thus, adverse possession now functions as a tool for 
adjusting boundaries, often to the tune of a mere few inches or feet. 
For this actual, as opposed to imagined, role of adverse possession, 
justifications grounded in philosophical theories focused on the abstract 
concept of property are not fully satisfactory.  The justification for a doctrine 
performing such a mundane function must be more practical.  Adverse 
possession must be compared, and shown to be superior, to alternative tools 
that can perform the same boundary-drawing function.  This Article conducts 
such a comparison.  It explains that American law retains adverse possession 
because, contrary to popular belief, our formal system of property 
boundaries—which uses map lines—is unreliable, indeed unworkable.  The 
choice to retain this dysfunctional boundary system, some of whose 
imperfections necessitate adverse possession, is probably not socially 
efficient, but it serves the interests of a powerful industry bred by the existing 
system:  the title insurance industry. 
This Article thus supplements the somewhat inapposite philosophical 
accounts of adverse possession’s function in American law with a practical 
one.  It then stresses the normatively troubling aspects of that function.  
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Property Works in Progress Conference 2020 and the faculty workshop at Northwestern.  
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Based on this critique, this Article further advocates for judicial and 
legislative reforms to better reflect and regulate adverse possession’s true 
function in current American law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of adverse possession occupies a curious spot in property law.  
On the one hand, the doctrine enjoys a prominent position in both the law 
school curriculum and the practice of law.1  On the other hand, scholars often 
note how lacking its theoretical treatment is2 and, in almost all common-law 
 
 1. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY 293 (7th ed. 2017) (“Adverse possession 
claims generate substantial litigation.”); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse 
Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2420 (2001) (“The topic of adverse possession receives 
prominent treatment in most property casebooks and courses. . . .  [a]nd the doctrine has large 
practical importance as it could be dangerous for a lawyer not to know it.”). 
 2. Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1122, 1127 (1985) (“Surprisingly, there is very little systematic discussion of 
[adverse possession] in the legal literature.” (footnote omitted)); Stake, supra note 1, at 2421 
(“For all its importance, this remarkable doctrine does not seem well understood, at least as 
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jurisdictions outside the United States, the doctrine has been marginalized, if 
not wiped out.3  How to account for this contrast:  a doctrine so vital to the 
thinking of property law teachers and to the work of American property 
lawyers that still remains underexplained in law reviews and has vanished 
from peer countries’ property systems?  How could a doctrine be so central 
yet so dispensable? 
The contradiction, this Article argues, is rooted in a scholarly 
misunderstanding of adverse possession’s role.  A disconnect exists between 
the functions that scholars attribute to adverse possession and the functions 
that actually account for the doctrine’s vitality—or rather, its contingent 
vitality—in American law.  Commentators have traditionally approached 
adverse possession through a philosophical lens.4  They treat the doctrine as 
a window into the nature and role of the institution of property in a 
democratic society.5  In reality, however, adverse possession’s role has been 
primarily, if not exclusively, practical—indeed, incidental and almost 
coincidental.6  On the ground, adverse possession is the outgrowth not of an 
idea of property but of a specific land management system adhered to in 
America and nowhere else.7  As will be seen, adverse possession probably 
lacks an ideological justification but is vehemently defended in America 
because it profits a specific, and powerful, industry:  the title insurance 
industry.8  In other words, to understand adverse possession, we need not 
delve into the nature of property in a capitalist system.  Instead, we must 
explore the political and economic dynamics of land transactions within the 
specifically American version of a capitalist system.9 
Property scholars—and first-year law students—acutely feel the need to 
account for adverse possession due to its extraordinary effect.  Under the 
doctrine, if a person actually occupies, without permission, another’s land in 
a manner that is open, exclusive, and continuous for a specified period of 
time, that occupier wins title to the land.10  Adverse possession is thus a 
doctrine that transforms, through the passage of time, a trespasser into an 
owner:  it lifts title to land from its rightful owner and bestows it on an 
intruder.11  The doctrine thereby contradicts the basic tenet of our property 
law, indeed our capitalist regime, which is dedicated to protecting owners 
 
property doctrines go.” (footnote omitted)); Matthew Sipe, Comment, Jagged Edges, 124 
YALE L.J. 853, 853 (2014) (“Modern adverse possession doctrine appears to be in regular need 
of re-justification.”). 
 3. See infra notes 266–71 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. See Stake, supra note 1, at 2420 (“[T]he doctrine strikes at the heart of our concept of 
property.”). 
 6. See infra Part II.C. 
 7. See infra Part II.C. 
 8. See infra Part II.C. 
 9. See James Y. Stern, The Essential Structure of Property Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1167, 
1191–92 (2017) (criticizing scholars for not paying attention to issues of defining title). 
 10. See, e.g., Snook v. Bowers, 12 P.3d 771, 781 (Alaska 2000). 
 11. JOHN DWYER & PETER MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 76 (1998) (describing 
adverse possession as “[p]erhaps the most startling means of acquiring property”). 
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from nonowners and to empowering owners to autonomously dictate their 
assets’ uses.12  Capitalism is grounded in voluntary transactions between 
willing parties; adverse possession, conversely, forces an owner to part ways 
with her land.  Worse still, the doctrine forcefully transfers the land from its 
owner, not just to any nonowner, but specifically to the nonowner who 
entered the land unlawfully.  Adverse possession unabashedly rewards those 
ignoring property law’s commands.  It favors and incentivizes thieves.13 
To render this extreme result intelligible, scholars and prominent jurists, 
from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Judge Richard A. Posner, explain 
that the contradiction between the doctrine of adverse possession and 
property law’s normative goals is merely illusory.14  The doctrine may appear 
to undermine the law’s rules and priorities, but to the extent it actually does 
so—as it might in a given individual case viewed in isolation—it is only in 
service to the law’s overall functions and grand goals.15  Perceived within 
the correct context, commentators argue, adverse possession does not subvert 
the property system.  Quite the opposite:  adverse possession sustains the 
property system.16 
Two prominent theories of adverse possession exemplify this template.  
One theory portrays adverse possession as critical because it affords 
protection to the person who has grown attached to the land—the person 
living on it—as part of property law’s general effort to protect individuals’ 
reliance.17  A second theory describes adverse possession as necessary 
because it permits the shifting of property from those who do not use it (i.e., 
the land’s absentee owner) to those who do (i.e., the land’s actual occupier), 
thereby promoting efficient use of land, as is supposedly the property 
system’s goal.18  As these examples show, theorists naturally differ in the 
specific normative goal they assign to property, but they contend that adverse 
possession comes into play when property law’s basic rule respecting 
ownership protection no longer serves that goal.  True, the doctrine subverts 
 
 12. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001) (discussing property law’s expectations that 
nonowners know not to enter, use, or take the property of an owner, thereby ensuring owner 
autonomy). 
 13. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
55 (2002) (“[A]dverse possession is a legal mechanism that sanctions private takings of 
property.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics of 
Possession, 86 VA. L. REV. 535, 560 (2000) (“Adverse possession . . . improves rather than 
challenges the system of property rights.”). 
 15. Larissa Katz, The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession:  Sovereignty and Revolution 
in Property Law, 55 MCGILL L.J. 47, 50 (2010) (“[T]he morality of adverse possession is not 
a particularized morality, concerned with the relative deserts of the owner and squatter or the 
relative merits of the uses they have for the land . . . .  Rather, the morality of adverse 
possession is indirectly established through the role of adverse possession in allowing property 
law to serve its moral function.”). 
 16. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 860 (3d ed. 
2000) (“If we had no doctrine of adverse possession, we should have to invent something very 
like it.”). 
 17. See infra Part I.A. 
 18. See infra Part I.B. 
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property’s normal rules but only because such subversion at times becomes 
normatively vital.  Adverse possession steps into the breach when the 
mechanical protection of property becomes detached from that protection’s 
normative mission. 
This account is normatively appealing and, as even this tentative 
presentation of its reliance and efficiency variants shows, is logically 
consistent.  That logical consistency, however, hinges on a certain factual 
assumption respecting how adverse possession actually operates.  That 
assumption is, it turns out, plainly invalid. 
Arguing that adverse possession implements a compelling need to sidestep 
the harsh rules of property law so as to protect the more attached, or more 
efficient, user of land must envision a specific user.  To be consistent, the 
claims imagine an intruding user engaged in activities whose importance (to 
human attachments, to economic efficiency, etc.) justifies sidestepping 
property law’s dictates.  The normative argument for adverse possession 
descriptively conceives a possessor who, for example, occupies a house or 
cultivates a farm on land that a faraway absentee owner owns.  That image is 
not purely sentimental.19  To a great extent, it is grounded in the history of 
property law and the circumstances surrounding the original emergence of 
the doctrine of adverse possession.20 
In modern times, however, this quaint image has no resonance.  The idea 
of the squatter occupying otherwise forgotten land has little to do with 
adverse possession’s realities in 2021.21  Casebook staples in the field 
notwithstanding—and those staples are, it should be noted, mostly cases 
 
 19. John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL 
L. REV. 816, 826 (1994) (explaining that the law’s assumptions “apply neatly to the classic 
case—adverse possession of a developed parcel, such as land improved with a house or farm—
upon which the limitations model was premised in agricultural England”). 
 20. The doctrine’s emergence reflects the original common law that did not separate 
possession from ownership and that did not require documents for land transfers but rather 
completed transactions through occupation of land. See 5 GEORGE THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 573–74 (1979).  Ownership was not based on the 
modern concept of title, but on actual possession (“seisin”). See id. 
 21. An analysis of all reported state court decisions from 2019—identified through a 
Westlaw search—found eighty-seven adverse possession of land cases.  Only one arguably 
involved a squatter. Philadelphia v. Galdo, 217 A.3d 811 (Pa. 2019).  There, a neighbor 
expanded his possession of his own land to also include an adjoining city-owned vacant lot. 
Id. at 813–14.  Even ignoring this factual caveat, the case’s doctrinal relevance here is 
somewhat questionable because adverse possession claims against governments have 
traditionally constituted a separate body of law. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 168–
69 (5th ed. 2016).  Of the remaining eighty-six adverse possession cases, one was a “color of 
title” case. See Chapman v. Settles, 265 So. 3d 866 (La. Ct. App. 2019).  On color of title, see 
infra Part III.A.3.  Two cases involved failed claims under specific state statutes setting 
foreclosure procedures. US Bank Tr., N.A. ex rel. LSF8 Master Tr. v. Trimble, 296 So.3d 867, 
869 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019); Herrmann v. Bank of Am., N.A., 97 N.Y.S. 344, 347–48 (App. 
Div. 2019).  One involved a dispute between co-owners. Hodge v. Wright, 435 P.3d 126, 130 
(Okla. Civ. App. 2019).  One was a family dispute. Scott v. Hicks, 567 S.W.3d 266, 272 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2019).  And one combined a family inheritance dispute with a boundary dispute. 
Hammond v. Hammond, 438 P.3d 408 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).  All other cases involved pure 
boundary disputes, as did the three reported federal adverse possession decisions. 
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distinguished by their remoteness in time or place22—the prototypical current 
adverse possession controversy follows a different, and much less stirring, 
factual pattern.  Standard adverse possession cases nowadays involve 
disputes over fences intruding on a neighbor’s land,23 bushes or trees 
mistakenly planted beyond the property’s border,24 driveways that cross the 
property line,25 and the like.  Boundary disputes, rather than the standing of 
squatters or homesteaders, form the realm of adverse possession in 
contemporary American law.26 
And for boundary disputes, the normative justifications for adverse 
possession’s treatment of squatters and homesteaders are inadequate, if not 
wholly irrelevant.  Asserting that protecting the intruder is crucial for 
assuring meaningful attachments or efficient land uses is somewhat far-
fetched when the intrusion consists of a few feet—or inches—of a fence, 
garden, or path.  Providing the planter of a tomato bush27 or the leveler of a 
driveway28 ownership of those few feet or inches of land—at the expense of 
the tract’s true owner—does not clearly and forcefully promote meaningful 
human attachments or efficient land uses.  Standing alone, the plight of the 
tomato planter or driveway leveler does not justify disturbing settled 
principles of property ownership protection.  The maintenance of a stray 
tomato bush or a driveway’s few inches could hardly be said to give voice to 
property’s essence in our capitalist system.  The legal system’s choice to 
protect these intrusions through adverse possession thus cannot easily be 
justified through appeals to property philosophy. 
Because adverse possession in practice is concerned not with 
accommodating squatters but with settling boundary disputes, it must be 
justified as a mechanism performing that very specific function—rather than 
any grand philosophical assignment.  Property law’s reliance on adverse 
possession is warranted only to the extent that, as a practical matter, adverse 
possession is an effective tool for policing borders. 
Until now, commentators normatively assessing adverse possession, 
preoccupied with abstract philosophies of property, have largely failed to 
fully compare adverse possession to other mechanisms that carry out the 
 
 22. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 150 (8th ed. 2017) (using Van 
Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 106 N.E.2d 28 (N.Y. 1952)); SHELDON F. KURTZ ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 196 (6th ed. 2012) (using Tapscott v. Cobbs, 52 
Va. (11 Gratt.) 172 (1854)); SINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 299 (using Nome 2000 v. 
Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1990)). 
 23. See, e.g., Brown v. Gobble, 474 S.E.2d 489, 492 (W. Va. 1996). 
 24. See, e.g., Chuckta v. Asija, 903 A.2d 243, 244 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (forsythia 
bushes); Lewis v. Aslesen, 635 N.W.2d 744, 745 (S.D. 2001) (trees). 
 25. See, e.g., Trokey v. R.D.P. Dev. Grp., LLC, 401 S.W.3d 516, 520–21 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2013). 
 26. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 90 (5th ed. 1998) (observing that 
boundary cases are the majority of adverse possession cases); SINGER, supra note 21, at 164 
(“Most disputes covered by the law of adverse possession are border disputes.”). 
 27. Spangler v. Schaus, 264 A.2d 161, 165 (R.I. 1970). 
 28. Trokey, 401 S.W.3d at 523. 
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same function of boundary setting.29  But only a comparison of this kind 
could validate adverse possession’s alleged worth and necessity.30  This 
Article engages in such a comparison and finds adverse possession lacking. 
To conduct such a comparison, this Article turns our attention back to 
property law’s basic task—defining and protecting rights in land31—and 
examines the most straightforward system the law can employ to define 
land’s boundaries:  reliance on formal property lines.  The system of formal 
property boundary lines is a structure necessary for all transactions.32  
Individuals would be unable to buy and sell land if no agreed-on system for 
delineating property’s borders—the contours of the land traded—existed.33  
A boundary-setting and -tracking system is thus a common, indispensable 
resource.  Yet it is not costless.  Maintaining the mapping system and 
assuring that all transactions accurately reflect it requires expenditures.  The 
state can dedicate the funds necessary for these tasks, thereby providing 
owners with a reliable formal boundary system.34  Alternatively, the system 
can be left to the private market, where private owners, through individual 
transactions, manage it.35 
To economize their own costs, the American states have opted for the 
private option.36  But once a state makes this choice, the resultant system will 
inevitably suffer from certain inaccuracies.  For example, because no central 
authority dictates a common vocabulary or mandates consistent descriptions, 
disparate transactions can contradict each other in their descriptions of the 
same lot.  The deed for Lot A will place its boundary with Lot B at one spot, 
while the deed for Lot B will place the same boundary with Lot A at another 
spot.37  One deed selling Lot A will identify one boundary, while a later deed 
for that same lot A will designate another.38 
Adverse possession is the law’s means to contend with such mistakes.  
Adverse possession is striking to most observers due to its blunt rejection—
 
 29. See, e.g., Michael V. Hernandez, Restating Implied, Prescriptive, and Statutory 
Easements, 40 REAL PROP.  PROB. & TR. J. 75, 106–08 (2005) (contending that prescription is 
unjust toward the owner while assuming that simple and full reliance on the public record for 
determining property rights would be possible in the doctrine’s absence); Merrill, supra note 
2, at 1129–30 (assuming that adverse possession is an efficient way to manage such disputes). 
 30. The adverse possession literature sometimes simply assumes that the formal system 
is effective and adverse possession is therefore the element introducing uncertainty. See, e.g., 
Stake, supra note 1, at 2439 (“Compared with the rules of title transfer, which determine 
record title primarily from documents that remain reliable for many years, the elements of 
adverse possession are indeterminate.”). 
 31. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:  
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000). 
 32. See Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property 
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1288 (2008) (arguing that property is about regulating search 
costs in an efficient manner). 
 33. See Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (1982). 
 34. See infra Part II.A. 
 35. See infra Part II.B. 
 36. See infra Part II.B. 
 37. See, e.g., Harris v. Walden, 333 S.E.2d 254, 257–58 (N.C. 1985). 
 38. See, e.g., Macallister v. DeStefano, 463 N.E.2d 346, 349–50 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984). 
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indeed, overruling—of legal property lines.39  But the truth is that in America 
there are no real formal property lines because the law adopted a private 
option for boundaries’ management.  Adverse possession serves as the law’s 
acknowledgment that that private option is inherently imperfect.  Adverse 
possession treats that imperfection, but it does not, and does not portend to, 
treat it perfectly.  It cannot fully replace a comprehensive (but expensive) 
public system in providing certainty to market actors.  Adverse possession 
does not solve all mistaken boundaries cases—for example, it only deals with 
long-standing mistakes.40  Furthermore, its very existence adds more 
uncertainty to the system.41  A buyer purchases land under the risk that the 
boundary of the purchased tract is not as it seems or that it might shift over 
time:  a neighbor might have gained, or might later gain, some of the 
purchased land through adverse possession. 
The risks that the absence of a formal public system creates, and buyers’ 
desire to mitigate them, generate a demand for a market product.42  Buyers 
in a property world that lacks a strong public system of boundary 
management wish for some assurances.  As with other risks individuals 
would rather not bear, like those of fire or accident, the market provides that 
assurance through insurance.  For a price, a title insurance company will 
assume on the buyer’s behalf the risk of mistakes in the description of a 
property or the rights therein. 
While American lawmakers’ decision to retain this mostly private system 
of property boundary management could have been based on an informed 
assessment of the relative social benefits and costs of each system,43 this 
Article’s analysis concludes otherwise.  Drawing on the literature on interest 
group dynamics and surveying land registration and adverse possession 
practices in other common-law systems, this Article finds that title insurance 
companies are the culprits behind America’s dedication to its inefficient 
private boundary system.  For their industry’s survival, these entities are 
heavily interested in the absence of a reliable formal system for managing 
boundaries.  That system, in turn, demands that the law retain adverse 
possession.44  Adverse possession is one price, alongside payment of 
insurance premiums, that the general public—all landowners in America—
pays to subsidize the title insurance companies.45  Alas, brute interest group 
dynamics, rather than high-minded ideals regarding property’s goals, are 
responsible for adverse possession’s remarkable endurance. 
 
 39. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
 40. Comment, Enhancing the Marketability of Land:  The Suit to Quiet Title, 68 YALE 
L.J. 1245, 1256 (1959) (“Statutory provisions barring actionable claims not asserted within a 
specified time contribute little to improving the saleability of land.”). 
 41. See CHARLES C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION 101, 106 (1961) (noting the 
possibility that adverse possession doctrines can introduce, as well as resolve, uncertainty). 
 42. See infra Part II.C. 
 43. See infra Part II.D. 
 44. This holds whether or not the specific policies title insurance companies issue cover 
adverse possession.  The companies do not need adverse possession—they need the weak 
formal boundary system, which, in turn, needs adverse possession. 
 45. See infra Part II.E. 
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This conclusion is not merely of theoretical import.  Beyond explaining 
adverse possession’s current role better than traditional justifications, it also 
performs important prescriptive functions.  Adverse possession’s nature as 
an imperfect mechanism for settling boundary disputes should affect judges’ 
attitudes toward three of the doctrine’s legal elements.  The doctrine’s true, 
and decidedly practical, function in our contemporary land system should 
guide the interpretation of the tests applied to discern whether two of the 
doctrine’s most contested conditions for awarding land to the intruder—
hostility and notoriety—have been satisfied in a given case.  It should also 
impact the treatment of a special category of cases known as “color of title” 
cases.  Additionally, this Article’s findings respecting adverse possession’s 
true function should engender legislative reforms.  They suggest that the 
mechanisms used for drawing property boundaries should be perceived as a 
“public utility”:  a vital natural monopoly, not dissimilar to traditional 
services legally characterized as utilities, such as electricity or railroads.46.  
The title insurance market must accordingly be made subject to a certain form 
of administrative regulation, inspired by the same regulation that governs 
utilities.47   
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I reviews the traditional 
explanations for adverse possession and highlights their shortcomings.  
Building on these criticisms of the existing accounts, Part II suggests that 
adverse possession’s true function is to settle the boundary disputes that are 
inevitable in our land system.  For this purpose, this part presents the 
competing regimes that can manage land transactions, identifies the 
American regime’s flaws, and explains why those flaws generate the need 
for adverse possession.  Part II also assesses the reasons why American law 
adheres to an inherently flawed system necessitating adverse possession.  It 
establishes that adverse possession is necessary to our land management 
system due to states’ inability to move toward a centralized system—a move 
that would require overcoming title insurance companies’ resistance.  Part III 
considers prescriptive ramifications of this finding.  It recommends better 
ways of understanding and interpreting different elements of adverse 
possession doctrine.  It also suggests a framework for regulating the title 
insurance industry. 
I.  EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION AND THEIR LIMITS 
A landowner has the basic power to exclude.48  She has the legal power to 
decide who may enter her land.49  If some individual enters that land without 
such permission, that individual is deemed a trespasser.50  Because trespass 
 
 46. See infra Part III.B. 
 47. See infra Part III.B. 
 48. J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (2000) (“[T]he right to property is a 
right to exclude others from things . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
 49. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997) (accepting that 
the continued plowing of land, despite the owners’ protests, was intentional trespass). 
 50. See, e.g., Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1998). 
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is a tort,51 the owner can petition a court for an injunction ordering the 
intruder’s removal. 
If the trespasser meets the requirements of adverse possession, however, 
that trespasser cannot be removed.52  To establish such an adverse possession 
claim, the trespasser must show that she:  (1) actually possessed the land, (2) 
in an open and notorious manner, (3) exclusively, (4) adversely to the 
owner’s interests, and (5) continuously for a number of years the statute 
details.53  The time period that the different states institute ranges from five 
to forty years.54  States sometimes modify these requirements or add further 
ones,55 but they do not alter adverse possession’s essence:  adverse 
possession is an exception to trespass. 
As a defense to a trespass claim, adverse possession is readily explicable.  
It reflects an application to the property context of the general statute of 
limitations rule, which bars claims brought too long after the occurrence of 
the facts giving rise to those claims.56  Good reasons justify such a temporal 
block on trespass claims, as on all other legal claims.  Retaining evidence 
becomes difficult as time passes;57 a defendant comes to assume that the 
claim will not be brought (and thus, for example, refrains from keeping 
financial reserves for a payout);58 and courts should not concern themselves 
with claims that the parties themselves have neglected.59 
These are all good reasons to shield an intruder from a delayed trespass 
claim, but adverse possession goes further.  Adverse possession not only 
prevents a trespasser from being removed, it actually transfers ownership of 
the intruded land to her.60  If the requirements detailed above are met, the 
trespasser becomes the land’s owner at the expense of its real, or title, owner.  
Indeed, she might proceed herself to bring a trespass claim against the owner 
if the owner ever attempts to reenter the land.61  This remarkable result of a 
 
 51. See, e.g., Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 217 (Colo. 2003) (en banc). 
 52. SINGER, supra note 21, at 43. 
 53. See Apperson v. White, 950 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). 
 54. 10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 87.01 (David A. Thomas ed., 2019). 
 55. Some states, for example, require the possessor to pay taxes. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 32-
21-7-1 (2021). 
 56. See, e.g., Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 394 A.2d 299, 302 (Md. 1978) (noting 
that “the adoption of statutes of limitations reflect[s] a policy decision regarding what 
constitutes an ‘adequate period of time’ for ‘a person of ordinary diligence’ to pursue his 
claim” (quoting Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 378 A.2d 1100, 1104 (Md. 1977))). 
 57. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (noting that statutes of limitation 
“protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth 
may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of 
witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise”). 
 58. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944) 
(discussing the limiting role that statutes of limitations play on the enforcement of statutory 
versus common law actions to recover wages). 
 59. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (“[T]he courts ought to be 
relieved of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights.”). 
 60. See 10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 54, § 87.03. 
 61. Id. 
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successful adverse possession claim defies easy explanation.62  Special 
rationales—not the mere procedural grounds provided for the statute of 
limitations’ usual operation as a defense to a claim—must back this 
extraordinary effect.63 
Starting in the late nineteenth century, jurists have attempted to uncover 
these rationales.64  In the ensuing decades, several explanations have been 
developed and refined.  Here, this Article groups them into three categories:  
reliance, efficiency, and quieting title.65  It relies on this tripartite scheme for 
convenience alone.  Certain explanations might fall into more than one of the 
categories, disparate explanations might operate in tandem, and other, 
perhaps better, categorization schemes are imaginable.  This part’s goal, 
however, is not to promote a specific ordering scheme for adverse 
possession’s justifications.  Rather, it is to present the disparate explanations 
the literature offers for adverse possession and to detect their weaknesses—
and, where present, strengths—so as to construct a better account in Part II. 
A.  Adverse Possession as Protecting Reliance 
“The true explanation of title by prescription seems to me to be that man, 
like a tree in the cleft of a rock, gradually shapes his roots to his surroundings, 
and when the roots have grown to a certain size, can’t be displaced without 
cutting at his life.”66  Oliver Wendell Holmes’s statement is probably the 
most famous sentence written to explain adverse possession in America.67  It 
gives voice to a notion in line with common intuition, whereby at its heart, 
adverse possession is a tool set to maintain the important relationship a 
person develops over time with the land on which she finds herself.  The idea 
has retained resonance in legal and scholarly discussions about adverse 
possession.68  Naturally, over the intervening years since Holmes wrote his 
vaunted lines, the study of property law has greatly evolved, and many new 
 
 62. Adverse possession is unique in this effect among the defenses to trespass. See, e.g., 
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (establishing a right of entry under public accommodation laws); United 
States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1991) (analyzing the effects of claimants’ necessity 
defense). 
 63. In most states, the statute of limitations merely limits the ability to bring an action for 
recovery of possession, as it does with respect to all torts.  Courts then made the added move 
to actually transform the possessor into the owner through judicial doctrine. See 3 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY:  A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES § 15.2 (A. 
James Casner ed., 1952).  In a few states, the statutes themselves are couched in terms 
indicating that the occupant acquires title through their operation. See id. § 15.2, at 761. 
 64. For the literature’s history generally, see John Lovett, Disseisin, Doubt, and Debate:  
Adverse Possession Scholarship in the United States (1881–1986), 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1 
(2017). 
 65. For a similar breakdown, see Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass:  The Case for 
“Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1059–63 (2006). 
 66. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to William James (Apr. 1, 1907), in THE MIND 
AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES:  HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, LETTERS AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 417, 
417–18 (Max Lerner ed., 1946). 
 67. See, e.g., Lovett, supra note 64, at 14 n.73; Merrill, supra note 2, at 1131; Stake, supra 
note 1, at 2419. 
 68. See, e.g., Tioga Coal Co. v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 546 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 1988) (“We 
believe that Justice Holmes’ view of adverse possession represents sound public policy.”). 
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sophisticated theories have emerged.  Several of these still draw on Holmes’s 
original insight when approaching adverse possession.69  They have 
developed Holmes’s insight further and provided it with stronger normative 
backing by situating it within currently prevalent understandings of property 
as an institution invested in the protection of individuals’ personhood or of 
social reliance interests. 
One influential rereading of the roots idea of adverse possession integrated 
it into a personhood theory of property.70  Under the personhood theory of 
property, the law affords varying protections to different properties in 
accordance with the given property’s importance to its owner’s life.71  Some 
assets—a home, a family heirloom—are deeply embedded in an individual’s 
personhood.  Other assets—money, stock—are not part of the individual’s 
personality; they are only held for their market value and are hence fungible.  
The law protects personhood properties more forcefully than fungible ones:  
the latter are, by definition, replaceable, while the former are specifically 
necessary for maintaining one’s personality.72 
This theory of property can readily account for adverse possession by 
echoing Holmes’s old insight.  The adverse possessor has been on the land 
for a lengthy period of time; that land has become part of her life.73  For her, 
the property is now a personhood property.74  The original owner, on the 
other hand, has not been on the land.  Worse still, she has been ignoring it—
she was not even aware someone else was using it.  Just as over time the land 
has come to form part of the possessor’s personality, it has become fully 
fungible for the owner.75  Hence the law, via adverse possession, prioritizes 
the interests of the possessor, who holds the personhood interest in the land, 
over those of the owner, who now holds a mere fungible interest.76  
Personhood theory adherents thereby situate adverse possession’s roots 
explanation within a property theory focused on individual rights. 
The roots explanation, first introduced by Holmes, also fits into a less 
individualistic, more socially oriented, property theory.  Over the past two 
decades, such social theories have proliferated.77  They go by different 
names, but collectively, they can be referred to as progressive property 
 
 69. Merrill, supra note 2, at 1131–32 (finding four modern variants of Holmes’s insight). 
 70. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 
(1982). 
 71. Id. at 987. 
 72. Id. at 978–79. 
 73. See Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 
741–42, 748 (1986). 
 74. Id. at 748. 
 75. Id. 
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VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1616 (2008); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
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theories.78  They theorize that property’s function is to promote human 
flourishing, and flourishing consists of much more than mere individual 
entitlements.79  Relationships with others are also vital for human 
flourishing.80  Furthermore, because property law aims to enable all society 
members to flourish, it might sometimes force an owner to relinquish some 
of her powers to accommodate other individuals’ needs.  Property ownership 
thus encompasses not only individual rights but also obligations toward 
others.81 
For progressive theories, adverse possession illustrates this social and 
obligation-oriented nature of property.  The doctrine highlights the fact that 
property focuses on protecting an individual’s reliance on her surroundings 
as necessary for human flourishing.82  The possessor, who has been on the 
land, relies on the persistence of her relationship with that land.83  She builds 
her life and social relationships there and becomes attached to the 
surrounding community.  The owner, for her part, should be subject to an 
obligation of allowing the possessor to maintain that attachment and 
community, especially because her past behavior—when she, the owner, did 
not intervene with the possessor’s stay—permitted that attachment to 
strengthen.84  It would be unfair toward others to permit the owner to step in 
and attempt to unravel these communal connections.85 
Viewed as necessary for protecting a personal attachment to land (under 
personhood theories) or a social attachment to a community (under 
progressive theories), the reliance-based explanation of adverse possession 
does more than merely justify the doctrine.  It asserts that without adverse 
possession, property law cannot, in certain circumstances, live up to its 
promise of fortifying individuals’ relationships and the stability of 
communities.86  The reliance-based explanations thus transform the doctrine 
from an aberration in property law demanding an excuse into a key element 
of the law, exemplifying its overall goals. 
Unfortunately, while adverse possession theoretically secures attachments 
and relationships—and thus can draw from the reliance justification—in 
reality, it hardly ever does.  The reliance justification’s adherents themselves 
have admitted a certain such disconnect.  Specifically, they note the difficulty 
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 79. See id. at 743–44. 
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presented by the fact that adverse possession awards ownership not only to 
individual invaders but also to invading entities such as corporations.87  
Personhood and progressive property theories center on human beings; a 
corporation does not have much of a personhood interest, and its flourishing 
is not empathically embraced by progressive scholars.  This one 
inconsistency can perhaps be written off as an inevitable, and maybe 
worthwhile, cost of adopting a doctrine necessary for human flourishing in a 
legal system that mostly does not distinguish humans from corporations.88  
Still, even if not debilitating in and of itself, this inconsistency is 
symptomatic of the reliance account’s more general and unacknowledged 
removal from the doctrine’s actual operation. 
While in the abstract, adverse possession can be viewed as invested in 
protecting reliance interests important for personhood or human flourishing, 
the doctrine’s real-world application no longer performs that function.  This 
section’s review explained that personhood accounts view adverse 
possession as protecting a person from losing her home or farm; progressive 
accounts view adverse possession as keeping a person in her community.  
That means, however, that these accounts are all afflicted by the flaw noted 
in the introduction to this Article:  almost all modern adverse possession 
cases are not about keeping a possessor in her home or community.89  They 
are about granting a neighbor a few extra feet (or inches) of land located at 
the margins of her property.90 
For boundary disputes, concepts of roots or reliance are inescapably 
tenuous.91  An individual’s loss of a few feet of land when a boundary is 
adjusted does not displace her roots.  Even if the intruder must remove a few 
bushes she planted or a driveway she paved, a major unsettling of her reliance 
is unlikely.92  If an intruder endures a loss in a boundary dispute, she is not 
forced to leave her house or community.  Consequently, neither the 
personhood nor the progressive variants of the roots account can justify the 
need to expand protection through adverse possession to the intruding 
possessor in such disputes. 
The reliance rationale has distinguished provenance and finds further 
support in some of the most influential contemporary property theories.93  It 
could explain the archetypal adverse possession case of yore and, in the 
process, effectively shed light on property law’s goals in a democratic 
 
 87. SINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 309; Radin, supra note 73, at 749. 
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society.  Despite these theoretical merits, however, the reliance account does 
little to justify adverse possession as it operates in modern form.  
Accomplishing that mission requires an explanation that does not apply 
exclusively to the (today, mostly irrelevant) case of a squatter’s protection. 
B.  Adverse Possession as Promoting Efficiency 
While personhood and progressive theories advocate protecting property 
when property is put to certain uses, efficiency theories of property are 
agnostic with regard to the specific uses to which property must be 
dedicated.94  Hence, they might more successfully account for adverse 
possession’s current function.  Efficiency-minded commentators argue that 
society recognizes and protects legal institutions, such as property, not due 
to a commitment to some objective judgment respecting desirable behaviors 
or uses but rather because these institutions increase overall social utility.95  
Applied to property, this framework proclaims that the law’s goal is to assure 
the most valuable uses of land.96  Individuals are awarded ownership over 
land because an individual’s decision regarding her asset’s use is much 
likelier to maximize its value than a decision another makes.97  If one 
individual is deemed an asset’s owner, she reaps the benefits of a wise 
decision respecting its use.  Correspondingly, she pays the costs of an unwise 
decision.  She thus has an incentive—that others do not have—to make the 
best decisions for the asset.  Furthermore, as the person closest to the asset, 
she knows best its conditions and potential.98  For these reasons, private 
decision-making over assets’ use and transfer is deemed superior to common 
holding or state control.99 
Adverse possession, of course, diverges from this baseline:  it deprives the 
individual owner of the power to determine her land’s uses.  Still, efficiency-
minded commentators have endeavored to justify adverse possession as 
promoting property’s overall goal of assuring efficient land use.100  Adverse 
possession does so, the argument goes, by moving an asset from an individual 
who does not value it much to another who values it more.101 
As noted, to win an adverse possession claim, an individual must actually 
possess the land.102  She must possess it exclusively—that is, while the owner 
herself is not possessing the land.103  Furthermore, she must possess it 
undisturbed by the owner for a lengthy period of time.  That the possessor is 
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on the land for a long while, as the owner ignores her (and the land), indicates 
that the possessor values the land much more than the owner.104  Therefore, 
from an efficiency perspective, it is better if the possessor controls the 
land.105  Adverse possession assures this desired result by lifting ownership 
from the owner—who has been “sleeping” on the land106—and granting it to 
the possessor—who values and uses it.107 
This efficiency case for adverse possession might appear rather 
simplistic.108  It makes two assumptions that must be established or explained 
away:  one pertaining to the parties’ respective valuations of the land and a 
second pertaining to the infeasibility of a market transaction between the 
parties.   
First, the idea that the adverse possessor inherently and necessarily values 
the land more than its owner is not obvious.  To satisfy an adverse possession 
claim’s elements, the possessor need not improve the land, just possess it.  
No structures need be built; permanent, or even temporary, habitation need 
not be established.109  The quintessential evidence for possession—
fencing110—does not automatically entail any work on, or betterment of, the 
enclosed area.111  Conversely, the fact that the title owner has been “sleeping 
on” (ignoring) the land does not always imply that she is undervaluing or 
underutilizing it.112  Active use is not always a land’s best use:  preservation 
is a socially and economically valuable use.113  Even in traditional 
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developmental terms, sometimes land is best kept underdeveloped.114  This 
allows for the management of land supply, which increases values in the long 
term, prevents real estate bubbles, leaves land available for development 
patterns that might become popular later, and so on.115 
These observations require refining the efficiency justification as 
presented above.  An intruder’s lengthy possession of land does not 
necessarily imply that the owner values the land less than her, but it probably 
provides a strong indicator.116  It serves as a proxy; by no means a perfect 
proxy but a proxy nonetheless.117  An imperfect proxy inevitably generates 
risks of mistake:  relying on this proxy, adverse possession might end up 
awarding land to a possessor who in fact values the land less than its owner.  
Still, the law tolerates this risk due to land’s unique nature as an asset.  Unlike 
most other assets, land is a limited resource.118  The law thus places a special 
premium on not seeing land go to waste.119  Adverse possession staves off 
such waste by neglectful owners, and for that reason, society finds acceptable 
the risk of mistake the doctrine introduces.120  Adverse possession does not 
assure that land is used in the most valuable way, but it increases the 
likelihood of that eventuality; given that eventuality’s importance, the 
increase in its likelihood is worthwhile—despite potential costs.121 
Aside from assuming that the possessor uses the land better than its owner, 
the efficiency account of adverse possession must make a second 
assumption, which pertains to the impossibility of a deal between those 
parties.  Why is adverse possession needed to shift the land to its more 
effective user to begin with?  Under economic analysis’s own terms, for the 
desirable transfer of an asset to its better user, no external intervention is 
needed.  The individual who values an asset more than its current owner will 
pay more money for it than what the current owner demands.122  Hence, a 
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transaction will be accomplished.  It follows that if a possessor indeed values 
land more than its title owner, the former will simply purchase it from the 
latter.  If such a deal does not materialize, then the possessor does not truly 
value the land more.  The forced transfer of the land in such circumstances 
to that possessor through adverse possession decreases utility as it ignores 
the parties’ bargaining preferences, which reflect their true valuations.123 
The only way to maintain that the forced deal might still increase utility is 
to presume that the voluntary deal between the owner and the possessor does 
not materialize, not because the two parties do not desire it but due to some 
other, external reason.124  The assumption is that the deal would be 
efficient—the possessor does value the land more than the owner—but is 
blocked on account of “transaction costs.”125  Reaching a deal, any deal, 
always involves bargaining, and bargaining is not costless.  A buyer might 
desire to buy but cannot find the seller,126 she might value the asset more 
than its holder but has no way of learning or transmitting that fact,127 or she 
might need intermediaries to draft an agreement.128  Such transaction costs 
often preclude the consummation of a deal that would benefit both parties.  
In such cases of market failure, the law must facilitate the efficient deal.  It 
might even have to force the deal.  Read in these terms, adverse possession 
is a legal intervention necessary to achieve an efficiency-enhancing transfer 
that the market cannot autonomously produce.129 
The challenge for the efficiency argument is to identify those transaction 
costs that supposedly block the efficient market deal.  Why is it prohibitively 
expensive for the owner who does not value the land, and the possessor who 
does, to transact?  One answer is that the owner might be tempted to extort 
the possessor, thereby making the deal artificially unappealing and hindering 
it.130  Knowing that the possessor has already invested in the land, as she has 
been on it for years, the owner could demand an exorbitant price that does 
not accurately reflect her valuation of the land131 and which the possessor 
cannot afford.132 
This claim is not without its limitations.133  Criticism grows even more 
compelling when considering the reality this Article highlights, whereby 
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most adverse possession cases involve boundary disputes.  The supposition 
that an owner can draw on extraordinary market power to abuse the possessor 
is far from evident.134  First, the power might be mutual:  just as the owner is 
the only potential seller the possessor can deal with, the possessor might be 
the sole buyer the owner can approach.  This actuality is almost inevitable in 
boundary disputes.135  Second, the notion that the owner can safely assume 
that the possessor cannot walk away from the land—and is thus susceptible 
to extortion—ignores the fact that the possessor’s sunk investments might be 
negligible.  As noted, adverse possession does not require the possessor to 
improve the land.  Hence, the possessor’s acts on it might amount to no more 
than erecting a fence, planting a bush, or removing debris.136  Such 
investments are rarely priceless:  the possessor’s fear of losing them is 
unlikely to embolden an owner to make exorbitant demands. 
True, a case could be imagined of an owner silently observing an intruder 
constructing major improvements for years and then popping up demanding 
payment.137  In such a case, the demand could indeed be extortionate and 
unreflective of the land’s true value to either party, thereby derailing a 
mutually beneficial deal.  Such circumstances could perhaps materialize in 
an extreme case of a boundary dispute:  a neighbor might mistakenly build a 
small part—perhaps no more than a few inches—of her house’s foundation 
or of one of its walls on the owner’s land.  To remove the intruding 
foundation or wall, the neighbor would have to demolish her entire house, 
and thus the owner enjoys an awesome power in negotiating with the 
neighbor.  But, property law already renders this eventuality almost 
impossible.  Several doctrines—improving trespasser, relative hardship, and 
unjust enrichment—preclude the owner from procuring an injunction to have 
such intruding buildings removed.138  Consequently, in the most easily 
imaginable circumstances of a rather hard-to-imagine scenario of the 
scheming owner, the law already thwarts the owner’s efforts to extract 
outrageous rents from the possessor.139 
Perhaps a case could still somehow crop up where adverse possession 
would be the only way to avoid an asking price’s unreasonable inflation.140  
But the need to resort to extreme and unlikely sets of hypothetical facts only 
highlights the difficulty in pinpointing the transaction costs allegedly barring 
 
 134. Even the claim that an actor’s market power is a transaction cost is contested. See Lee 
Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1481 (2013). 
 135. The same probably applies to nonboundary cases, too.  Because the owner has not 
acted with respect to the relevant land for a lengthy period of time, little reason exists to 
assume that it is generating much market interest. 
 136. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 137. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 2, at 1131; Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans, An 
Economic Theory of Adverse Possession, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 164 (1995). 
 138. See SINGER, supra note 21, at 169–70. 
 139. Fennell, supra note 65, at 1060–61 (detailing the legal tools rendering impossible such 
extortion of possessors). 
 140. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 58 (justifying adverse possession as a 
cure to an owner’s “strategic behavior [setting] a trap [for] innocent occupants”). 
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an efficient deal between possessor and owner.141  Prevalent efficiency-
grounded explanations of adverse possession provide only blank statements 
about the prohibitive costs of using the formal system to complete the owner-
possessor deal.142 
An efficiency justification for adverse possession demands more.  The 
forced transfer of property from an allegedly less efficient user to its 
allegedly most efficient user runs counter to the logic of economic analysis.  
Furthermore, it similarly runs counter to the logic of current laws.143  For 
example, the owner of Vincent van Gogh’s most important masterpiece could 
store it in an underground basement on a deserted island and only choose to 
bring it out during rainstorms for use as cover for her lawn furniture.144  Still, 
the law does not remove it from her and bestow it to a public museum where 
it would clearly be much more appreciated.145  A developer cannot 
unilaterally take hold of old unused industrial grounds that could produce 
more social value as commercial or residential lands; even the government 
itself is not always free to do so.146  In a capitalist system, the law does not 
just redistribute property to its better user. 
Given efficiency theory’s, and the law’s, strong belief in and commitment 
to market efficiency, exceptional transaction costs justifying the 
displacement of market transactions cannot simply be assumed.  If adverse 
possession is to be justified on transaction costs grounds—as it must for an 
efficiency account—these costs must be identified.  A positive answer must 
 
 141. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1131 n.38 (explaining that, given the time the landowner 
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 142. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 101, at 154 (“[A] rule for acquiring title by 
adverse possession lowers the cost of establishing rightful ownership claims by removing the 
risk that ownership will be disputed . . . .”); Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future:  The 
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 143. See White Bros. & Crum Co. v. Watson, 117 P. 497, 499 (Wash. 1911) (“The next 
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 144. See JOSEPH SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT:  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS 
IN CULTURAL TREASURE 1(1999) (“Many of the greatest artifacts of our civilization can be 
owned by anyone who has the money to buy them, or the luck to find them, and their owners 
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puts it bluntly enough:  ‘[A]n eccentric American collector who, for a Saturday evening’s 
amusement, invited his friends to play darts using his Rembrandt portrait as the target would 
neither violate any public law nor be subject to any private restraint.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting 6 FRANKLIN FELDMAN ET AL., ART LAW:  RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF CREATORS AND 
COLLECTORS § 5.1.1, at 434 (1986))). 
 145. See Shoked, supra note 86, at 822 (discussing droit de suite and redesigning this 
element of copyright law to “make royalties payable to a public entity promoting public access 
to art”). 
 146. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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be provided to the question:  are there attributes of the market for land 
rendering certain desirable deals between owners and long-term possessors 
prohibitively, though artificially, expensive? 
C.  Adverse Possession as Quieting Title 
The only way in which adverse possession can be portrayed as efficient is 
as a means for reducing the procedural costs of transacting.  Thus, perhaps 
the doctrine’s explanation should be sought in justifications that are explicitly 
concerned not with the property system’s substantive goals (for example, 
reliance or efficiency) but rather with the procedures employed to achieve 
those goals.  And indeed, a justification is often provided for adverse 
possession that focuses not on property law’s substance but on its form.  
Precisely because it is not focused on the law’s substantive goals, such a 
justification is appealing to a diverse group of writers.  For it can easily 
complement any of the explanations for adverse possession seen above.147 
A body of law, such as property or contract law, is not only committed to 
certain substantive goals, but it is also committed to effective administration 
of the law.148  Form, not just substance, animates legal doctrines and, at 
times, might even be prioritized over substance.149  Thus, some specific 
doctrines, such as adverse possession, can perhaps best be explained as 
occupied not with any of the law’s overriding goals but with smooth 
administration of the law.150  The desire to promote smooth administration 
of property laws has been a function ascribed to the doctrine ever since its 
inception:  adverse possession is said to be needed to “quiet title.”151  That 
is, it “makes ownership more settled or certain.”152  Because property, more 
than most other legal institutions, is geared toward facilitating impersonal 
interactions respecting fixed assets, such ease of administration is seen as a 
benefit in and of itself.153  It can further serve any of property’s contesting 
substantive goals discussed earlier.  Quieting title allows individuals to rely 
 
 147. See supra Parts I.A, I.B. 
 148. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1686–87 (1976). 
 149. See Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Supreme Court, 
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1671, 1674–75 (2016) (arguing that U.S. Supreme Court Justices 
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 150. See Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision:  A Theory of Judicial Decision 
for Today, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 951 (1923) (arguing that “rules . . . applied mechanically 
are more adapted to property . . . [while] standards where application proceeds upon intuition 
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Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577 (1988) (“Property law . . . has 
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stand.”). 
 151. Quieting title is one of the earliest justifications provided for adverse possession.  The 
earliest statute protecting possessors opened with the statement:  “For quieting of Men’s 
Estates, and avoiding of Suits, Be it enacted . . . .” The Limitation Act 1623, 21 Jac. c. 16 
(Eng.). 
 152. Stake, supra note 1, at 2441. 
 153. See Pound, supra note 150, at 951. 
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on their relationships with their lands and with their neighbors.154  It also 
facilitates market transactions.155 
Adverse possession simplifies the administration of property law—quiets 
title—by curbing litigation and adjusting legal realities to reflect realities on 
the ground.  The doctrine authorizes a court to refuse to accommodate, or 
even hear, certain claims.  A judicial willingness to adjust land rights to any 
relevant claim would engender an excess of litigation.156  For example, if a 
neighbor knows that a court will never budge from a formal boundary line, 
the neighbor will persist in a dispute even if he does not care much about the 
contested land.157  In such and all other potential cases, courts and parties 
must waste resources in investigating all rights and claims that might have 
ever applied to contested land.158  Such investigations into the past and into 
all contending claims are costly affairs that often yield indeterminate 
findings.  The constant threat of such potential claims alone suffices to cloud 
property ownership with uncertainty.159  Adverse possession removes that 
cloud.  It empowers a court to announce that claims are stale—to ignore 
claims irrespective of their actual merit.160  Adverse possession streamlines 
property rights’ definition by subjecting to a technical cutoff date all 
challenges to existing property rights.161 
Adverse possession’s mode of identifying those existing property rights 
that are shielded from potential litigants’ claims is presented as the ultimate 
simplification device.162  The doctrine simply announces that recognized 
legal rights are to be derived from facts anyone can physically observe when 
visiting a property today.163  Adverse possession, in other words, equates 
legal reality with reality on the ground.164  Such a move renders 
 
 154. Stake, supra note 1, at 2441–42. 
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 164. See Muth & Cox, supra note 100, at 13. 
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administering property rights exceptionally easy, and therein lies, 
commentators argue, adverse possession’s great appeal.165 
Yet, popular as the claim is, when actually fleshed out, the appeal of 
adverse possession as an administrative tool is rather superficial.166  How 
exactly is adverse possession “quieting?”167  Adverse possession is an 
exceptionally complicated doctrine—counting at least five elements—that 
necessitates intense judicial analysis.168  The doctrine determines who owns 
contested land in light of multiple tests a court must apply individually to any 
given set of facts.169  Some of these tests invite the court to engage in fact-
intensive analysis adjusting results to specific circumstances.  Consider 
adverse possession’s hostility element, requiring (at a minimum) a 
determination that the possessor was never granted permission to enter.170  
Research into the parties’ behavior and communications over years and 
decades is inescapable.  Still other tests an adverse possession claim must 
satisfy are rather open-ended.  For example, what counts as “actual” 
possession?171 
According to the quieting title account, adverse possession assures an 
observer that the person she sees on the land is the land’s owner, irrespective 
of any potential contradictory claims.172  In actuality, however, adverse 
possession only tells the observer that the person she sees is the owner if a 
court at some later point deems that person to have actually possessed that 
land exclusively, in a hostile manner, and openly, for a period of time the 
statute sets.173  These determinations afford a court much discretion to seek 
“fairness.”174  Turning to such subtle tools for the pursuit of a “fair” result 
may perhaps be inevitable as long as adverse possession is a doctrine dealing 
with squatters’ rights.175  In those extreme cases, substantive questions 
geared toward ascertaining fairness are perhaps natural and might thus even 
 
 165. The easy administration of property rights is often presented as the only true 
justification for adverse possession. See, e.g., Ballantine, supra note 156, at 135 (“The statute 
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2662 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
appear predictable to parties.176  But as this Article stresses, the doctrine 
currently inhabits the boundary-dispute universe, and there, these substantive 
considerations are not as obviously important or intuitive.  Courts’ leeway in 
analyzing them is so ample that individuals’ ability to predict results when 
contemplating contested boundaries is exceptionally limited.177 
Under the scheme commonly employed to categorize a doctrine’s mode of 
administering legal results, adverse possession is the quintessential 
standard.178  Legal doctrines assume one of two forms:  rules or standards.179  
Rules prescribe specific results—they draw clear lines.  Judges faced with a 
factual pattern can mechanically apply the rule dictating an outcome.180  
Standards are rules’ opposites as they supply a court with flexibility to 
analyze each case in light of policies it seeks to promote.181  The argument 
that adverse possession is necessary to quiet rights is an argument that a 
standard is necessary to provide clarity—and that is a particularly peculiar 
argument.  Rules, not standards, are normally associated with that 
clarification function.182  As a standard, adverse possession is a very “noisy” 
doctrine that renders property rights more—not less—expensive to 
discern.183 
The traditional quieting title justification for adverse possession thus 
cannot solve the problem the doctrine’s efficiency justification 
encountered.184  That challenge was the need to identify the transaction costs 
allegedly blocking a voluntary deal between owner and possessor.  The 
quieting title justification merely refocuses the problem.  If a doctrine whose 
application is anything but straightforward is necessary to quiet title, title in 
its absence must be shown to be tremendously unquiet. 
Why would the property system’s administration be unbearably costly in 
the doctrine’s absence?  How does property law generate legal claims whose 
determination is costlier than the application of an unpredictable standard 
cutting them off?  What are the impossible difficulties that render a clumsy 
standard necessary as a clarifying device?  Without answering these 
questions—as opposed to just assuming the answers185—any explanation for 
adverse possession’s persistence remains lacking.  For that reason, the next 
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part will answer those questions to thereby develop a more coherent 
justification for adverse possession than the existing ones this part reviewed. 
II.  THE NEED THAT ADVERSE POSSESSION ACTUALLY ANSWERS 
Jane is buying Blackacre from John.  How does she know what 
Blackacre’s boundaries are?  How does she know what John’s rights are 
there?  In the simplest of terms, how can Jane make sure she is buying what 
she thinks she is buying?  Practitioners and scholars are all well acquainted 
with the formal rules dictating the procedures for completing land 
transactions.  Still, heretofore, these rules have hardly been thoroughly 
considered when justifying adverse possession.186  Yet, Part I showed that 
the sole way to justify adverse possession is through exploring these 
procedures.187  Adverse possession can only be vindicated if, standing alone, 
these formal mechanisms for defining boundaries erect an unsatisfactory 
system that must be supplemented by that costly doctrine. 
This part therefore reviews the formal rules property law uses to set 
boundaries.  It first introduces the seemingly optimal system—a registration 
system.  Then it turns to the suboptimal system American law employs—a 
recording system.  Thereafter, it presents the mechanisms rendering this 
suboptimal system workable:  adverse possession alongside private 
insurance.  This exercise explains the persistence of adverse possession and 
the role the doctrine plays in our property system.  It also facilitates an 
assessment of that role and a comparison, which concludes this part, of the 
American system for setting boundaries and the optimal system. 
A.  The Straightforward Formal System for Land Management:  A Registry 
Most individuals probably envision a straightforward system for 
transacting in land.188  When Jane contemplates purchasing Blackacre, she 
should be able to turn to a central database telling her what Blackacre’s 
boundaries are, who owns Blackacre, and whether there are any other rights 
or obligations associated with Blackacre (easements, such as rights of way, 
and covenants, such as building restrictions, for example).  This information 
should be readily legible.  A database should thus provide Jane with a 
 
 186. Authors simply assume that the formal system is operable and, hence, adverse 
possession adds costs to it. See, e.g., Stake, supra note 1, at 2439–40 (“Compared with the 
rules of title transfer, which determine record title primarily from documents that remain 
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 187. See supra Part I. 
 188. See C. Dent Bostick, Land Title Registration:  An English Solution to an American 
Problem, 63 IND. L.J. 55, 61–62 (1987). 
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detailed map of Blackacre and inform her, say, that John owns a fee simple 
there and no one else owns any rights therein. 
Now assume that, based on this information, Jane purchases Blackacre 
from John.  Later, it turns out that the database had misplaced Blackacre’s 
boundary.  John only owned half of Blackacre:  the other half actually forms 
part of neighboring Greenacre, which David owns.  Many individuals would 
perhaps assume that because the mistake was not Jane’s, but rather embedded 
in a database she must rely on, Jane should be shielded. 
In other words, a purchaser of land likely expects the formal system to 
satisfy two demands:  standardized information and assurances of 
reliability.189  These elements appear necessary for a market in lands.190  If 
people do not know what they are buying, they would hesitate before buying, 
which would deter transactions.191  If they were to have access to that 
information, but could not trust it, they would still hesitate, and transactions 
would still be deterred.  Because a working market is necessary for assets’ 
efficient allocation, and because land is an asset of limited quantity whose 
inefficient allocation would be exceptionally costly for society, the legal 
system strives to provide market actors with these two perquisites for a 
willingness to transact in land. 
In the common-law world, this function is performed through the Torrens 
registration system.192  In a Torrens system, a central location—often, the 
county office—will hold a registry containing information on all area lands.  
In that registry, each lot has a unique number referencing the land as it 
appears on a plan.193  The plan details the lot’s boundaries.  It also lists the 
names of the owners and of holders of any other interests.194  A transfer of 
the lot is achieved only through changing that registration (to indicate the 
name of the new owner or the new boundaries).195  In this manner the Torrens 
registration system proffers standardized information about landholding. 
It also assures reliability—actors’ second demand for entering a market.  
Because in the Torrens system a land transfer is only completed through 
registration, registered title is indefeasible.196  That is, an interest registered 
cannot be challenged.197  While, as in any other human-managed system, 
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mistakes may occur, the state guarantees the Torrens registry’s accuracy.198  
If the registry contains a mistake in the description of the land or its owner 
the purchaser relying on the registry in good faith still holds good title.199  
Although the registered owner, John, from which the purchaser, Jane, bought 
the land only owned half the land, Jane will keep the land she bought as 
described in the registry.  The true original owner of the other half of the 
land, David, who would consequently lose his interest, will receive monetary 
compensation from a state-managed assurance fund, which is funded through 
registration fees.200 
The Torrens registration system thus furnishes land purchasers with the 
two elements they demand.  First, it is a standardized system providing 
readily available accurate information (nowadays, it can be accessed online).  
Second, it is a highly effective insurance system, promising the purchaser 
that the land as they see it in the registry will be what they receive.  In case 
of mistake, the purchaser will lose nothing:  they will not even have to settle 
for monetary compensation.  They will keep the land as originally described. 
B.  The American Formal System for Land Management:  A Record 
The Torrens registration system simplifies land transactions and is thus 
aligned with popular intuitions.  Yet it is not the system American states 
adhere to.201  Instead, American law relies on a recording system. 
The differences between the Torrens registration system and the recording 
system flow from the disparate manners for concluding land deals in each.  
As noted, in a Torrens system, a land transfer is completed through 
registration.  Conversely, in a recording system, the transaction is not 
completed by changing details in some central database.202  Rather, the 
transaction is completed by the grant of a deed from the owner.203  That deed, 
in turn, need not be reported to a central authority or made public in any other 
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way to take effect.204  A purchaser can keep her deed in her bedroom and the 
land will remain hers.205  The system does, however, provide the purchaser 
with an incentive to make the transfer public.206  If a purchaser does not 
record her deed, a later purchaser of the same land from the original seller—
who happens to be a swindler—could trump the earlier purchaser’s rights.207  
To protect her rights by putting such potential future buyers on notice of her 
purchase, a purchaser thus has an incentive to file her deed with the recorder 
of deeds208—normally, the county office.209  Thanks to this legal incentive, 
deeds are almost universally recorded.210 
But the resulting record is just that:  a compilation of all deeds filed in the 
county.211  The record merely provides evidence of deals, rather than actually 
embodying them (as it does in a Torrens system).212  Even as a record of 
deals, it is quite deficient.213  Inconveniently, the record does not organize 
the pieces of evidence—the deeds—by lot but indexes them by names of 
sellers and purchasers.214  Moreover, because the deeds are merely stored for 
future observers’ use, they are not subject to any review for validity.215  
When a new deed for a purchase of Blackacre is filed, it might not correspond 
 
 204. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Berrett, 910 A.2d 1072, 1080 n.4 (Md. 2006) (stating 
that an unrecorded deed is valid between the grantor and grantee and also as to third persons 
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 205. Homeowners Fin. Co. v. Stuart, No. CV-186010887, 2019 WL 2573805, at *3 (Conn. 
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ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-411.01 (2021). 
 207. See 1 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 4, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 
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 208. See Ralph W. Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 MICH. L. REV. 405, 
415 (1924) (“[T]he person claiming under the instrument in question by his failure to observe 
the direction of the statute confers upon the party who executed the instrument . . . a sort of 
statutory power to displace the interest vested by the execution of the instrument.”). 
 209. See Bostick, supra note 188, at 68. 
 210. See BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE 55 
(2012). 
 211. See 1 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES, supra note 207, § 2. 
 212. 3 id. § 671 (“We speak of land titles in the United States as ‘record titles’ because 
statutes in each state provide for the recordation of muniments of title in public records that 
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from an examination of those public records. . . .  [T]he recording statutes . . . merely afford[] 
an additional method of giving constructive notice of one’s rights.” (footnotes omitted)).  
Some states do accept the record as primary evidence with no requirement that the original 
deed be produced—but there too, the record remains a tool for merely providing evidence, 
even if primary rather than secondary. See PAUL E. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 13 (2d 
ed. 1970). 
 213. See Muth & Cox, supra note 100, at 15–16. 
 214. Only a few states index by tract. See Note, The Tract and Grantor-Grantee Indices, 
47 IOWA L. REV. 481, 486–87 (1962). 
 215. See Walter E. Barnett, Marketable Title Acts—Panacea or Pandemonium?, 53 
CORNELL L. REV. 45, 45 (1967). 
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to an earlier deed selling Blackacre.216  The earlier deed could contain 
different boundaries.217  Mistakes in descriptions, as well as typographical 
errors, are rather routine.218  There need not even be common standards for 
descriptions and boundaries219—so much so that sometimes a deed’s 
description might not even produce a bounded tract.220  Consequently, rather 
often, interpreting boundaries can be a tall task even for courts.221  
Additionally, and inevitably, the identity of the person listed in the deed as 
its current owner might be mistaken:  an earlier deed giving rights to another 
individual might have been misplaced, misfiled, or gone unfiled. 
In sum, a record of deeds is very different from a registry.  A recording 
system, unlike a registration system, does not provide a snapshot of the layout 
of, and rights in, all lots; rather, at best, it provides an archive of all 
transactions made in the lot, as the transacting parties in each such deal chose 
to define the lot. 
Now consider again Jane’s situation as she seeks to purchase Blackacre 
from its purported owner, John.  When Jane approaches the record, she must 
research the history of all transactions in Blackacre, examining all the deeds 
to it, to verify that John has a good interest (i.e., she must know that John 
acquired the land from an individual who actually owned it, and that that 
individual had done the same, and so on, back in time).  To further verify that 
the interest she is obtaining from John is indeed the interest she thinks it is, 
she must also verify that no discrepancies exist between all those deeds in 
their descriptions of Blackacre.  If such discrepancies exist—a not unlikely 
eventuality, given that some deeds might have been drafted decades, if not 
centuries, earlier222—the record, as a mere compilation of deeds, does not 
settle them.223  It follows that if a mistake is found in the deed on which Jane 
relies when purchasing Blackacre from John (say, the deed originally 
transferring Blackacre to John mistakenly described it as including portions 
of Greenacre), Jane loses the land she thought she had purchased.  Because 
an owner cannot convey more than what he owns, and the record does not 
embody what John owned—it only provides evidence for what he owned—
 
 216. See Cherek, supra note 167, at 286. 
 217. See, e.g., Macallister v. DeStefano, 463 N.E.2d 346, 349–50 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984). 
 218. Cherek, supra note 167, at 286. 
 219. See Charles Szypszak, Real Estate Records, the Captive Public, and Opportunities for 
the Public Good, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 5, 33 (2007) (noting the need “for a more precise and 
consistent method of describing real estate parcels”). 
 220. See, e.g., Macallister, 463 N.E.2d at 347 (“[T]here is no dispute that were the first 
course description in these deeds literally followed, there would be no closure of the 
description of the parcel.”). 
 221. See, e.g., Greenan v. Lobban, 717 A.2d 989, 990 (N.H. 1998) (construing a deed 
referencing a boundary “on the shore” of a lake); see also 23 AM. JUR. 2D Deeds §§ 247–69 
(2007) (referencing numerous cases involving deed interpretation). 
 222. See Scott v. Anderson-Tully Co., 154 So. 3d 910, 913–15 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) 
(explaining that since the contested land was originally surveyed in 1805, there was little 
information for the parties to use when tracing that survey and thus concluding that neither 
party could describe the disputed tract with accuracy or certainty). 
 223. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1128 (noting that recorded deeds may contain defects or 
omissions and that surveying errors might result in misplaced boundary markers). 
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if John did not own those portions of Blackacre, he could not have sold them 
to Jane.  Jane’s reliance on the record’s description of John’s rights could be 
meaningless.  David, neighboring Greenacre’s owner, could claim half of 
Blackacre, land Jane thought she purchased based on an old faulty deed. 
In and of itself, therefore, the recording system provides Jane with neither 
the standardized information nor the assurance of reliability she demands 
before freely transacting in land.  The boundaries of the land the record 
contains can be inconsistent, and they are never conclusive.  Standing alone, 
a recording system is painfully unsatisfactory.  With that realization, an 
answer to the puzzle that materialized at Part I’s conclusion—why adverse 
possession is needed to complement or quiet the formal title system—is 
within reach. 
C.  The Tools Rendering the American Formal System Workable:  Adverse 
Possession and Title Insurance 
How does the American recording regime satisfy the purchaser’s two 
demands—standardized information and reliability assurances—vital for 
transacting in land?  Because, unlike the Torrens registry, the recording 
system itself is lacking, tools external to it must supply these elements.  
Adverse possession, as this section explains, is one of those tools—
responsible mostly for the first element:  standardizing information.  But 
adverse possession, as will also be seen, is an incomplete replacement for the 
Torrens system.  Adverse possession is an imperfect mechanism for 
standardizing information and it furnishes very little assurance of reliability.  
Another tool supplements it in facilitating land transactions in a recording 
regime:  private title insurance.224 
Adverse possession can only be justified, as Part I concluded, if it proffers 
a better alternative to the formal boundaries system.  Because adverse 
possession is a rather unruly standard, that premise could hold if the formal 
system were extremely dysfunctional.  Adverse possession could only be 
appealing if the information the formal system provided about rights were 
even less accurate than the murky predictions individuals can make 
respecting future adverse possession rulings.  As just seen in the preceding 
section, those are exactly the circumstances presented by our land transacting 
system.  In a recording regime, the formal system does not even purport to 
provide accurate information.  A recording regime is, in this regard, the 
opposite of a registration regime.  A registry provides standardized, accurate 
boundary information.  Therefore, in Torrens systems, adverse possession is 
normally disallowed.225  But that, again, is not the American system. 
 
 224. See generally 1 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES, supra note 207, § 41 
(discussing the alternative methods for protecting against title defects). 
 225. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-111 (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 185, § 53 
(2021) (“No title to registered land . . . shall be acquired by prescription or adverse 
possession.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 43–21 (2021) (“No title to nor right or interest in 
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription 
or adverse possession.”). 
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As highlighted throughout this Article, adverse possession’s most striking 
attribute is its emphatic rejection—indeed, overruling—of formal property 
lines.  As can now be understood though, that attribute is hardly troubling or 
surprising.  To the contrary, it is salutary and necessary.226  In our nonregistry 
system, the rule the formal boundaries represent, which the adverse 
possession standard seemingly undermines, is not much of a rule to begin 
with.  Even referring to it as a rule is misleading.  Giving voice to this insight, 
the U.S. Supreme Court recently refused to adopt lot lines as the sole factor 
determining compensation when government confiscates land.  “Lot lines 
have varying degrees of formality across the States, so it is difficult to make 
them a standard measure . . . .”227  In a sense, American law does not 
recognize true map lines.  While they exist in a Torrens system, in a recording 
system they do not, as the record offers no binding, central property maps.  
All that the American system makes available to purchasers are descriptions 
that parties drew in their deeds—descriptions that need not be consistent or 
accurate.228 
In such a legal universe, full reliance on the formal lines is impossible.  
Contradictions between deeds describing the same land are inevitable, and 
an earlier deed can be so ancient as to contain undecipherable boundary 
descriptions.229  A purchaser desiring to know what she is buying based on 
the formal system could survey the land, but given the formal system’s 
inherent flaws, that survey would sometimes do her no good.230  Adverse 
possession enables the purchaser to sidestep the problem and simply rely on 
the land’s boundaries as currently occupied—that is, as the purchaser 
observes them.231  Adverse possession is, therefore, the requisite informal 
alternative to the formal system, which by definition cannot supply the 
purchaser with one of her two demands for engaging the market:  
standardized information. 
Adverse possession does little, however, to answer the purchaser’s second 
demand—assurance of that information’s reliability.  Adverse possession 
does assure a purchaser that if she buys the land in reliance on mistaken 
information, and then occupies it in a manner meeting certain conditions for 
 
 226. See CALLAHAN, supra note 41, at 99 (acknowledging that if the United States were to 
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 227. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1948 (2017). 
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ownership dispute resulting from deeds to adjoining lands, both of which included the 
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See H. W. Chaplin, Record Title to Land, 6 HARV. L. REV. 302, 305 (1893). 
 230. Merrill, supra note 2, at 1128. 
 231. See, e.g., Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210, 215 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (awarding, 
through adverse possession, land occupied by previous possessors, where all deeds, going 
back forty years, mistakenly described the land as fifty feet to the east). 
2670 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
a long period of time, her right will not be contested based on that original 
mistake.  But with the need to hold the land unchallenged for a lengthy period 
of time, and with so many requirements to be ascertained before immunity 
from suit is granted under adverse possession, this is a rather weak assurance. 
If the purchaser eventually meets the doctrine’s conditions, adverse 
possession will shield her, but until then it does not vouch for the information 
the purchaser receives when buying the land.  The doctrine, as seen, does not 
simply transform reality on the ground into binding legal reality:  it does not 
automatically deem the actual boundary the formal one.  Although it 
conveniently transforms the current situation into the legal situation, it first 
demands that several conditions be met.  Thanks to adverse possession, the 
fence the potential purchaser can physically see is deemed the land’s legal 
boundary, irrespective of the formal line—but only if the fence has been 
there, continuously, for the statutorily mandated period of time, was not 
permitted, and maybe more.232  A purchaser will encounter much difficulty 
in predicting whether the fence has met these criteria.  A purchaser is not 
assured, therefore, that the boundary she sees will be the one afforded her 
postpurchase.  No assurance is provided that a court will not later hold that 
the boundary she saw must shift because some requirements for a successful 
adverse possession claim failed. 
Additionally, by basing legal boundaries on circumstances on the ground, 
adverse possession introduces new uncertainties into the transacting process.  
Because it might render a possessor the owner, a purchaser buying from the 
owner might later find out that some of the owner’s land has actually shifted 
to a possessor of whom she was unaware.233  Adverse possession, therefore, 
through the very scheme it sets for providing buyers with information about 
the land, increases those purchasers’ accompanying need for assurance. 
Because neither the record nor adverse possession meaningfully do so, 
another, more effective, tool is needed to satisfy purchasers’ demand for 
assurance (which the Torrens system answers abroad).  That tool emerged in 
America in the late nineteenth century—around the time the Torrens system 
was spreading elsewhere.  It was private title insurance.234 
Generally, insurance is the market’s answer to situations where an 
individual would rather not bear a risk.  Individuals would rather not contend 
with the chance that their houses burn down, so they buy fire insurance; they 
would rather not carry the costs if their cars are stolen, so they buy car 
insurance.  In these and many other cases, individuals pay another entity—
an insurance company—a premium in advance, and if the feared eventuality 
occurs—their houses burn down, their cars are stolen—the insurance 
 
 232. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 233. See CALLAHAN, supra note 41, at 100–02 (noting that adverse possession actually 
leaves buyers with less assurance when they are contemplating a transaction, as it can only 
raise doubts respecting the owner’s title). 
 234. In 1874, Pennsylvania passed the first statute authorizing the incorporation of title 
insurance companies.  The first company was incorporated the following year.  For the history 
of title insurance, see BARLOW BURKE, LAW OF TITLE INSURANCE § 1.01 (3d ed. Supp. 2021). 
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company covers the loss.235  Individuals thus, for a price, shift the risk of loss 
to the insurance company.236 
Title insurance was developed to perform the same function.  When she 
buys land, the purchaser pays the insurance company a fee.  In exchange, if 
at a later date a mistake is discovered in the original land description and the 
buyer must give up parts of the land, the insurance company pays the 
disappointed purchaser compensation reflecting the loss.237  In this way, title 
insurance assures a buyer contemplating purchasing land that her investment 
will not be lost if that land’s description turns out to be inaccurate.  Given 
how crucial that assurance is, title insurance is now a part of every land 
deal.238  As one court put it:  “It is a matter of common knowledge and 
experience that in the usual situation, title insurance is indispensable to the 
occurrence of the real estate sale:  a seller would be unable to sell his property 
at its reasonable value if no title company was willing to insure title.”239 
Operating in tandem with the record, adverse possession and title 
insurance thus fulfill, in our system, a registry’s twin functions:  making 
available legible information about land and providing assurance against 
mistakes.  It is important to note, however, that the two mechanisms deliver 
on these functions only partially as compared to the Torrens registration 
system.  Adverse possession offers legible information about boundaries—
but that information is never fully accurate.  Title insurance assures the 
purchaser that if the information is mistaken, she will not lose her 
investment—but she will still lose the land (having to settle for monetary 
compensation) and she is not protected against title defects that emerge 
postpurchase (for example, from a later neighbor’s intrusion materializing 
into an adverse possession claim).240 
D.  The Explanation for the American System:  Social Interest 
Adverse possession has an important function in our property regime.  The 
doctrine aids in replacing a registration system with a record system.  The 
question then becomes why the law deems the record system a worthwhile 
replacement for that more straightforward and fully effective system.  The 
obvious appeal of any partial solution is the alleged savings it offers as 
compared to a more complete solution to the relevant problem.241  That is 
how the American choice to adhere to a recording system rather than the 
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optimal registration system is often justified.242  As this section establishes, 
that justification should also be read as the explanation for the law’s 
insistence on maintaining adverse possession, whose existence is tied to that 
of the recording system. 
In Part II.A, the registration system was offered as an intuitive fix for an 
inevitable problem.  It was presented as the most effective system for 
managing the market for land.  That impression is skewed, however:  the 
review focused on a registry’s benefits without sufficiently accounting for its 
price.  A registration system can be a rather costly affair, and therein lies its 
major drawback—and the replacement’s attraction. 
Intuitive as the registration system appears, putting it in place is an 
extremely complicated endeavor.243  The reason is the guaranteed standing 
of the snapshot of rights the registry contains.  If a mistake is found in that 
snapshot, the state, as noted, must indemnify the owner.  Perhaps more 
importantly, such a mistake will force the true owner to part with her interest 
in the land.  For if, when the state first introduces the registry, John is 
mistakenly registered as an owner of parts of Greenacre that in fact belong to 
David, then that land now legally belongs to John.  David will have to content 
himself with monetary compensation from the state.  This elevated status of 
the registry as legally conclusive once put in place mandates that it be 
produced only following a highly meticulous process.  Because once 
registered, rights cannot be dislodged (and those rights not registered 
disappear), in establishing the registry, all potential rights and claims to the 
land must be investigated.244 
In the United States, furthermore, that process probably cannot be fully 
administrative.245  Courts have held that constitutional separation of powers 
principles mandate judicial involvement in the investigation of rights to 
land.246  Because the power to determine title is reserved to the judiciary, an 
administrative agency cannot act alone.247  For every line drawn and interest 
determined in the registration process, interested parties must have recourse 
to the courts.248  Needless to say, this requirement slows down a registry’s 
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production.249  It also renders the process expensive:  a court system (or 
added burdens on the existing system), alongside lawyers arguing cases, must 
be funded.250 
A registration system thus involves high start-up costs.  These costs then 
enable the system, once established, to operate very cheaply.251  After the 
registry is in place, an actor contemplating a deal in land need only consult 
the registry to see who owns interests therein.252  No further verification is 
necessary.  The costs of transacting parties’ operating convenience are 
covered earlier by the state establishing the registry. 
The choice to forgo a registry spares the state those costs.  The recording 
system, accompanied by adverse possession, is costly for transacting parties:  
adverse possession introduces the constant threat of litigation and, regardless, 
anyone transacting in land must pay a title insurance company.  However, it 
is a very cheap system to establish.  All it calls on the state to do is establish 
an office where parties can record deeds. 
In the choice between a system with high setup costs and low operating 
costs (a registry), and one with the opposite (a record), American states opted 
for the latter.  American law can be understood to have preserved a role for 
adverse possession because it prefers the second of the two systems of 
funding land transaction costs.253  The American regime assumes that the 
ongoing operational costs adverse possession and insurance present are lower 
than the setup costs associated with a registry.  Furthermore, by embracing 
this funding route, the financial burden is shifted from the state to private 
actors. 
In the early twentieth century a few states toyed with the introduction of a 
registration system, but after brief experiments, they apparently concluded 
that, on the whole, the recording system’s operating costs are a bearable price 
to pay to avoid a registry’s high up-front costs.254  As a way of funding land 
deals’ transaction costs, the American regime assumes today that retaining 
the recording system is cheaper than having a more dependable formal 
system—even if the recording system comes with the added cost of adverse 
possession.  But is this assumption sensible? 
 
 249. The time required for completing the initial registration of one sole parcel was once 
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E.  The Explanation for the American System:  Private Interest 
The descriptively compelling justification for adverse possession 
uncovered in the preceding section is not necessarily also normatively 
compelling.  That justification centers, as seen, on a cost assessment:  on the 
belief that the recording system that adverse possession accompanies is 
cheaper than the alternative mechanism for managing boundaries, a Torrens 
system.  Is that a fair assessment?  This section will explain why the answer 
probably is no.  It will further explain that adverse possession’s persistence 
in our legal system owes less to the relative magnitude of its costs (compared 
to those of a registry) and more to the identity of the actors bearing those 
costs.  In the competition over legal reform, those who benefit from the 
recording system, which necessitates adverse possession, form the more 
effective interest group as compared to those the system and the doctrine 
disadvantage. 
The examination of adverse possession’s efficacy centers on the 
alternative registry system’s costs.  The initial costs of adopting such a 
system are presented as insurmountable.255  On paper, there is much 
supporting that projection.  The actual evidence, however, indicates 
otherwise.  The allegedly financially out of reach Torrens system has been 
spreading throughout the world consistently.256  So much so that the 
American insistence on retaining a recording system and the accompanying 
adverse possession doctrine is now clearly the minority position.  Common-
law systems elsewhere have almost uniformly shifted to the Torrens system.  
All Australian states and territories,257 almost all Canadian provinces,258 
New Zealand,259 Ireland,260 Scotland,261 Israel,262 and Singapore,263 now 
rely on registration systems.  Even England, birthplace of the old system on 
which the American regime is grounded,264 started its shift toward a 
registration system back in 1925.265  As they switched to a Torrens 
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registration system, most of these jurisdictions jettisoned adverse 
possession266 or at least rendered it peripheral and ineffective.267  Some 
specifically prohibited adverse possession in boundary disputes.268  England, 
from where the doctrine hails,269 effectively abandoned adverse possession 
in the Land Registration Act of 2002270 that perfected its registration 
system.271 
This comparative finding vindicates this Article’s argument that adverse 
possession’s role is to police boundaries in the absence of a reliable formal 
boundary system.272  In addition, the marked global trend casts serious doubt 
on the claim that a registry is inherently, and dramatically, more expensive 
than continued reliance on adverse possession.  Apparently, many other 
jurisdictions whose property law systems are not alien to ours found the costs 
of introducing a Torrens system bearable and justified.  Struck by this reality, 
one commentator noted: 
It is a baffling fact that the United States is rapidly becoming virtually the 
only country in the world whose land title system is not founded upon 
Torrens-type principles . . . .  [I]t [is] incredible that a system which seems 
to work quite well almost everywhere else cannot be satisfactorily adapted 
to the United States.273 
Scholarly consensus among American writers thus insists that a Torrens 
system is dramatically more effective than the current American system.274  
 
 266. Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 45D (Austl.) (barring adverse possession in 
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Law Property Theory and Jurisprudence in Canada, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 679, 690 (2015) 
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possession).  See generally Fiona Burns, Adverse Possession and Title-by-Registration 
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4 (same in Scotland); Burns, supra note 266, at 802 (same in South Australia). 
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1980 (Tas.) s 138Y (Austl.); Land Transfer Act 2007, s 164 (N.Z.). 
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STATES § 15.1 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (“The sole historical basis of title by adverse 
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 270. 2002, c.9 (U.K.). 
 271. The law mandates alerting the owner to an adverse possession claim, and that owner 
can then veto the claim. 
 272. See Lisa M. Austin, Property and the Rule of Law, 20 LEGAL THEORY 79, 94–95 
(2014) (noting that jurisdictions that adopt a Torrens system usually abolish adverse 
possession). 
 273. Barnett, supra note 215, at 93–94. 
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Systems for Transferring Real Property, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 213, 220–26 (1977); Myres S. 
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Commentators reckon that American exceptionalism in the land registration 
realm cannot be attributed to any exceptionally high costs American 
constitutional strictures (for example, mandating judicial oversight of the 
initial registration process) might generate because those can be, and have 
been, controlled.275 
American exceptionalism owes to a different, nonlegal, feature of the 
system.  The American land boundary management system has resisted 
global trends because it has given rise to a powerful party that holds a 
uniquely strong economic interest in the costs the current system generates—
a party that has successfully assured that the United States remains an outlier 
in the common-law world.  That party is the title insurance industry. 
As Part II.C noted, two mechanisms treat the costs that the recording 
system inevitably effects:  adverse possession and title insurance.276  In a 
Torrens registration system, the need for adverse possession, as already 
noted, disappears, but so does the need for title insurance.277  Because the 
registry itself insures a purchaser, few if any seek title insurance.278  As 
registered title is indefeasible, its purchaser does not demand any sort of 
private insurance.279  Though a useless product in a jurisdiction with a 
registry, title insurance is an indispensable one in a recording system 
jurisdiction.280  Therefore, the insurance industry is highly invested in—nay, 
dependent on—maintaining the recording system.  Predictably, it has 
repeatedly opposed the introduction of a Torrens system.281  Most recently, 
in 2018, the industry spent $400,000 on a lobbying campaign and 
successfully pressed the New York legislature to delay the implementation 
of a measure already passed to curb some of its practices.282  Even a measure 
so minor it “hardly qualifie[d] as a reform measure” could not surmount the 
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title insurance industry’s lobbying.283  Unsurprisingly, an actually 
transformative reform—a move to a registry—has consistently proven 
unimaginable.284 
The industry’s success in advocating for the proposition that “a little title 
examination is a good thing,”285 (a proposition that few would have predicted 
to curry much popular favor) is readily explicable in light of research into 
interest group dynamics.  One of public choice theory’s most fundamental 
insights is that small, intensely interested groups can overcome collective 
action hurdles that large, diffusely interested groups cannot.286  In the 
competition for regulatory reforms, their lower information costs, lower 
organization costs, and lower free rider costs combine to advantage narrowly 
focused groups at the expense of larger groups.287 
In debates over reforms of the boundaries management system, the title 
insurance industry is the quintessential intensely interested group.  The 
market is dominated by four major companies forming a practical 
monopoly.288  The risk that reform represents to these companies is 
enormous:  if the recording system is abandoned, their business will 
collapse.289  On the other side, the group standing to benefit from reform is 
the ultimate diffuse group—the general public.290  All property owners carry 
the costs of the current recording system:  every buyer must pay insurance 
premiums whenever purchasing land and must then live under the constant 
threat of adverse possession.291  Because these costs are diffused among all 
members of the public though, no one entity or organization lobbies the 
legislature to abolish the recording system generating these costs.292  Further 
exacerbating the problem, individuals are highly unlikely to even note these 
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costs that they bear.  Home buying, the occasion when insurance is acquired, 
is a relatively infrequent experience for most individuals.  Additionally, 
because title insurance premiums are about 1 percent of a property’s sale 
price,293 they are inconspicuous to buyers who, at the time of a deal’s closing 
(when the insurance premium is paid), are confronted with a baffling array 
of line items.294  The public is thus unlikely to appreciate the long-term 
benefits it will derive from a registry sparing it insurance costs.295 
Likewise, the ongoing threat—and cost—of adverse possession goes 
unnoticed by owners, similarly weakening the political impetus for 
change.296  Nonlawyers cannot be expected to be aware of a counterintuitive 
legal doctrine that lurks, mostly silently, in the background of the 
landholding regime.  When adverse possession moves to the fore, the public 
does tend to demand reform.297  In 2008, in two separate states, highly 
publicized successful adverse possession claims generated public outcry, 
which led legislatures to amend state laws and limit such claims.298  These 
events denote the public’s attitude toward the current adverse possession 
system’s costs:  the public might find them unacceptable, but it is simply 
unaware of them during regular times.299 
This reality simplifies the insurance industry’s lobbying task (especially 
as it finds lobbying allies in other interests, such as closing agents and 
lawyers, similarly benefitting from the complexity of concluding real estate 
transactions in a recording system).  Legislators are easily made to balk at 
proposals to fund a Torrens system.300  Faced with the prospects of raising 
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taxes—of which the public is always aware—to fund a solution for a problem 
the public ignores and from which an industry group benefits, states 
predictably embrace the status quo.301  They retain the current recording 
regime as our system for managing land transactions.  And adverse 
possession persists:  a doctrine necessitated by a boundary management 
system that is socially wasteful but is a boon to a powerful industry. 
III.  LEGAL REFORMS IN LIGHT OF THE NEED THAT ADVERSE POSSESSION 
ANSWERS 
Part II explained both the need that adverse possession answers in our 
property system and that need’s backdrop.  It thereby established the practical 
justification for adverse possession—and questioned its normative 
justification.  The specific task originally set for this Article has thus been 
completed.  But the answer provided for the Article’s theoretical question 
respecting adverse possession’s logic can and should also impact the manner 
in which current law is structured.  Two distinct groups of lawmakers should 
consider reforming the law in accordance with the theoretical findings:  first, 
judges confronted with adverse possession’s doctrinal details and, second, 
state legislators concerned with rendering the home buying process cheaper 
and fairer. 
This part’s first section addresses the former audience.  It inspects key 
elements in the doctrine of adverse possession that have so far proved 
incoherent or open to debate and shows how adverse possession’s true, and 
very concrete, goal, as identified in this Article, might better inform their 
analysis.  This part’s second section turns to legislative reform.  It draws on 
this Article’s conclusions respecting adverse possession’s interplay with title 
insurance to suggest better ways of regulating that industry. 
A.  Interpreting Adverse Possession’s Tests 
Adverse possession lifts title from the owner and bestows it on the 
possessor.  For this transfer to occur, a possessor must meet specific criteria.  
The normative goal behind the doctrine’s overall effect—the reason for its 
choice to transfer land—should animate the specific criteria the doctrine 
demands satisfied before that effect kicks in.  Accordingly, many of the 
writers attempting to explain adverse possession’s logic also endeavor to 
account for the doctrine’s requirements or argue for their reform.  Because 
this Article suggested a different, and more realistic, explanation for the 
doctrine’s continued existence, it is also better equipped to tackle some of the 
doctrine’s specific elements that other accounts have struggled with.  This 
section thus reviews three such elements:  the hostility requirement, the 
notoriety requirement, and “color of title.” 
 
 301. Goldner, supra note 192, at 709 (stressing the public’s predictable opposition to the 
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1.  Hostility 
To win an adverse possession claim, a possessor must prove that her 
possession was actual, open, continuous for the statutory period, exclusive, 
and hostile.302  Perhaps inevitably, it is the latter, the hostility (or adversity) 
element, that is key.303  It is the one element appearing in the doctrine’s name.  
Yet surprisingly, hostility is the element many of the doctrine’s accounts 
struggle most in explaining. 
In light of the hostility requirement, a possessor holding land with the 
owner’s permission will not win title, no matter how lengthy her 
possession.304  This result is baffling for some of the most popular 
explanations for adverse possession.  Those who justify adverse possession 
as a tool to protect a possessor’s reliance are pressed to explain the fact that 
a nonadverse possessor cannot rely on the doctrine.305  If the doctrine’s 
grounding is the desire to protect a person’s attachment to land she occupies, 
permission—or lack thereof—to be on that land seems a wholly irrelevant 
consideration.  Just as a trespasser allegedly forms, over time, a connection 
to a house or community, so does the licensee or tenant (i.e., a permitted 
possessor).306  Protecting the former’s interest but not the latter’s appears 
irrational if the interest adverse possession protects is merely that in reliance, 
as these explanations for adverse possession contend. 
Some of the efficiency-grounded justifications for adverse possession 
similarly stumble in taking count of the hostility requirement.  If adverse 
possession’s logic is to enable land’s transfer to its most efficient user—who 
allegedly is not its owner but its occupier—it should not always matter 
whether that occupier is on the land without permission.  Efficiency theories 
assume that an owner who ignores her land and thus fails to notice an 
occupier cares little about the land and is an ineffective user.307  But an owner 
who grants permission to another to occupy her land for free or in exchange 
for a nominal fee can hardly be said to always care more about the land.  If 
we assume that the former owner is sometimes an ineffective user (who 
should lose her land) we might just as well assume the same respecting the 
latter owner.308 
The prevalent explanations for adverse possession reviewed above, 
drawing on interests in reliance or efficiency, accordingly do not do a 
particularly effective job in explaining the doctrine’s defining element:  its 
hostility requirement.  The justification for adverse possession this Article 
develops can much more readily explain it.  The traditional theories fail in 
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this task because a possessor’s reliance on land, or propensity to put it to 
better use, are largely disconnected from the permission (or rather, lack of 
permission) awarded to her to enter the land.  By contrast, the justification 
for adverse possession advanced in this Article is all about hostility, and 
hence the doctrinal requirement materializes as wholly natural. 
As Part II established, in actuality, adverse possession is set in order to 
settle boundary disputes.  Its raison d’être is, therefore, the dispute:  the 
disagreement over a boundary’s location.  It follows that when such 
disagreement is absent, as when one party permitted the other’s 
encroachment, no recourse to the doctrine is necessary—or justified.  
Property law has distinct, and separate, doctrines that can move the formal 
boundary between lots when the bordering owners have in the past agreed to 
diverge from that boundary.309  Adverse possession is meant to address the 
case where no such agreement is present; indeed, as explained earlier, its 
concern is that often such agreements are unrealistic, if not impossible, given 
that formal boundaries in a record system are unclear. 
This nature of adverse possession’s function should also explain why the 
doctrine’s hostility element does not, in the vast majority of states, include a 
subjective requirement.310  A few states add to the objective no-permission 
test a subjective test, demanding that the entrant claiming land through 
adverse possession act in good faith.311  That is, that the possessor thought 
the land was hers and simply committed a mistake.  An even smaller number 
of states flip this subjective requirement:  they demand that the possessor 
know she is intruding.312  The courts adding either of these subjective 
demands—good faith or intentional dispossession—are clearly in the 
minority, however, and, given the insight into the doctrine’s true role this 
Article provides, they should be. 
Adverse possession’s goal is to proffer a system for boundary 
management:  a practical replacement for the formal system society refuses 
to optimize.  To achieve that goal, neither party’s mental state is relevant.  
Furthermore, because the doctrine’s existence is premised on the realization 
that often boundaries in a recording system are indiscernible, the doctrine 
assumes that most boundary intrusions are, in a sense, in good faith.  
Boundary mistakes, an inevitable part of the American property system, 
necessitate the doctrine.  That is why it would be wasteful, if not 
counterproductive, for the doctrine to insist that a possessor positively prove 
her good-faith mistake in each and every case.  The lack of such a 
requirement—the fact that in most states the hostility requirement does not 
translate into a requirement of good faith on the intruder’s part—has often 
been presented as the most objectionable, or unfair, element of adverse 
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possession.313  Once the doctrine’s actual role—solving inevitable boundary 
mistakes the system has opted to live with—is clarified, the counterintuitive 
nature of the hostility requirement is easier to accept. 
2.  Notoriety 
This Article’s account also aids in elucidating the logic of the other adverse 
possession requirement whose application is often held up as unfair:  
notoriety.  A successful adverse possession claim requires that the claimant’s 
possession be “open and notorious,” meaning that it puts the owner on 
notice.314  This requirement does not entail proof that the owner actually 
knew about the intrusion but merely that she could have known.315  
Therefore, an innocent owner, who was never aware that another person was 
on her land and thus never had the opportunity to act to remove the trespasser, 
could lose her land.316  The same occurs with an owner who never knew that 
the intruded land was hers to begin with.317 
This result is troubling because adverse possession has traditionally been 
understood as a tool for penalizing owners who sleep on their rights.  The 
title owner should lose her land, those explanations hold, because she opted 
to not pay attention to her land, thereby allowing another to become attached 
to it, underutilizing the land, or disquieting title.318  But if the owner did not 
actually know that her land was being intruded, she cannot that easily be said 
to have allowed these consequences; if she did not know the land was hers, 
she cannot even be said to have opted to not pay attention.  That she should 
still be held responsible for those detrimental social consequences (another’s 
reliance, underuse of land, or unquiet title) that the existing theories of 
adverse possession stress, with the attendant penalty of losing her land, is 
normatively unappealing.319 
Equipped with this Article’s new understanding of adverse possession’s 
function, this startling result the doctrine can produce is much less troubling 
or even surprising.  Adverse possession is not set up to penalize the owner.  
Thus, just as the intruder’s mental state is irrelevant for the doctrine’s 
hostility element, so is the owner’s for the notoriety element.320  Adverse 
possession is geared toward settling boundary disputes, whose presence and 
means of resolution have little to do with an owner actually knowing what 
she owns or where her neighbor’s land is located.  In fact, the doctrine is 
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premised on the assumption that many times boundaries are, in a sense, 
unknowable in the American landscape:  deeds conflict, old deeds have 
outdated descriptions, and so on.321  Due to the way our boundary and land 
transfer system is structured, “actual” knowledge of the real boundary is at 
times impossible.  Insisting that the owner actually know about an 
intrusion—through a strict interpretation of the notoriety requirement—
would be irrational. 
The unfortunate state of the formal boundary system that adverse 
possession addresses, as Part II showed, not only explains this doctrinally 
well-established reading of the notoriety requirement.  It should also serve to 
inform courts as they deal with a subset of cases whose treatment under the 
requirement is contested.  While doctrine clearly only holds that the owner 
should have known of an intrusion—even if she did not actually know—the 
question arises whether an owner should have known of an intrusion 
undetectable to the naked eye.  If the neighbor’s wall, fence, or driveway 
trespasses onto the owner’s land to the extent of only a few inches or feet, an 
owner will be unable to note it unless she conducts a periodic survey.322  In 
such situations, the owner could be viewed as not on notice because she could 
not have noted the intrusion by visiting the land.  Alternatively, she could be 
viewed as on notice because she could have had a survey done noting the 
intrusion.323 
New Jersey courts are probably the only ones that have explicitly adopted 
the former position.324  They insist that “as a matter of law no presumption 
of knowledge [arises] from the prior minor and passive encroachments along 
the common boundary line.”325  When “the fact of an intrusion is not clearly 
and self-evidently apparent to the naked eye but requires an on-site survey 
for certain disclosure . . . , such a presumption is fallacious and 
unjustified.”326  Some other courts have reached similar conclusions in 
individual cases,327 and some may limit the rights gained through 
imperceptive intrusions (for example, granting an easement for keeping 
intruding awnings but not title for the land below).328  However, the majority 
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updated Nov. 2020). 
 325. Stump v. Whibco, 715 A.2d 1006, 1010 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). 
 326. Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258, 263 (N.J. 1969). 
 327. See, e.g., Morgan v. Jenson, 181 N.W. 89, 91 (N.D. 1921) (holding that a bay 
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position is that an imperceptive intrusion does provide notice.329  Courts hold 
that because the owner could have had a survey taken through which she 
would have noted the intrusion, the owner was on notice.330 
In light of this Article’s findings, this position is ill-advised.  Because the 
presumption underlying adverse possession is that formal boundaries are 
sometimes unknowable, the majority approach materializes as incoherent.  It 
calls on owners to conduct periodic surveys of their land to avoid loss through 
adverse possession.331  Yet adverse possession’s justification is that the 
American land system generally assumes that a survey is of little help in 
determining boundaries.  As noted, at times, the formal lines cannot be 
identified through a survey.  An old deed might rely on unscientific markers, 
deeds to neighboring lots could cover the same area, different deeds for the 
same lot could contain different descriptions.332  In fact, our legal system 
does not ask the owner to survey her land even when she acquires it:  she is 
expected to rely on reality as she sees it and on insurance.333  Thus, requiring 
an owner to make periodic surveys of her land to verify that a neighbor is not 
intruding is inconsistent with the system’s structure.334  Intrusions into land 
that are undetectable to the naked eye should not count as putting the 
landowner on notice. 
3.  Color of Title 
Aside from helping to understand and interpret adverse possession’s 
hostility and notoriety requirements, this Article’s new reading of the 
doctrine’s role aids in grasping a specific category of cases for which adverse 
possession has developed a special rule seemingly undermining its normal 
requirements:  “color of title.”  In most jurisdictions an adverse possession 
claim is strengthened if it is made under color of title.  Possession is under 
color of title when it is based on a written instrument that while not truly 
 
intruding awning only generated a prescriptive easement); Greene v. Jones, 490 N.E.2d 776, 
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was not conspicuous enough to suffice for a successful adverse possession claim). 
 329. Scoville v. Burns, 207 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Ky. Ct. App. 1948) (finding notorious a wall 
and steps encroaching by eleven inches); Shinors v. Joslin, 180 P. 574, 574 (Mont. 1919) 
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extending along the boundary line to its apex, over which the roof of defendant’s residence 
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long . . . by . . . [a] fence and coalshed”); Lewis v. Idones, 116 N.Y.S.2d 382, 383–84 (App. 
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 330. Five Twelve Locust, Inc. v. Mednikow, 270 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1954) (explaining 
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 331. Mannillo, 255 A.2d at 264. 
 332. See supra notes 37–38, 217–21. 
 333. See supra Part II.C. 
 334. Mannillo, 255 A.2d at 264 (noting that requiring the “true owner” to “obtain[] a survey 
each time the adjacent owner undertook any improvement at or near the boundary . . . would 
place an undue and inequitable burden upon the true owner”). 
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conveying title, amounts to “an appearance of title.”335  Color of title, 
therefore, is normally established through a defective deed336:  a deed 
missing a signature,337 a deed from only one among multiple owners,338 a 
deed granted by someone not actually the owner,339 an invalid tax deed,340 
or a deed from a foreclosure sale voidable because of irregularities.341  In 
such cases the instrument purports and appears to grant title, but it fails to do 
so due to the legal defect.342  The grantee thus is not, and cannot be, awarded 
formal title through the document.  Still, that defective document might help 
her gain the land through adverse possession thanks to the color of title 
doctrine. 
Armed with a defective document that supplies color of title, an adverse 
possession claimant need not prove the one element of the claim that is often 
the most challenging:  actual possession of the whole land.  She need only 
prove “constructive possession.”343  With color of title, the claimant must 
only actually occupy one part of the tract covered by the defective document 
to be regarded as in possession of the whole tract.344  This represents a major 
exception to the normal rule applicable to adverse possession claims, 
whereby the awarded interest’s contours are wholly based on realities on the 
ground.345 
Color of title’s treatment also materializes as an exception to a successful 
adverse possession claim’s other core requirement:  hostility.  Because in a 
color of title scenario, the title owner at some point purported to transfer title 
to the possessor (through the faulty deed), how could she be said to have not 
permitted the possessor’s entry?346  The person entering land, relying on a 
deed, even if faulty, explicitly received permission.  Still, almost all courts 
find that possession under color of title is hostile.347  Their explanations for 
this seeming contradiction are so overly technical that they become 
incoherent.348  Commentators note that the rule should be viewed not in light 
of any internal logic but rather through its “practical utility” in enabling 
 
 335. 16 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 316, § 91.08. 
 336. A void court decree suffices, too. See Meinders v. Bd. of Educ., 344 P.2d 572, 573 
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 337. Romero v. Garcia, 546 P.2d 66, 67 (N.M. 1976). 
 338. Wallace v. McPherson, 214 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tenn. 1947). 
 339. Lott v. Muldoon Rd. Baptist Church, Inc., 466 P.2d 815, 816, 818–19 (Alaska 1970). 
 340. Green v. Dixon, 727 So. 2d 781, 783 (Ala. 1998). 
 341. Buckner v. Sewell, 225 S.W.2d 525, 531 (Ark. 1949). 
 342. Knight v. Boner, 459 P.2d 205, 207–08 (Wyo. 1969). 
 343. 10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 54, § 87.07. 
 344. See Roe v. Doe ex rel. Tenn. Coal, Iron & Ry. Co., 50 So. 230, 231 (Ala. 1909). 
 345. 4 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY, supra note 203, § 1155 (“As a general rule, one can 
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 346. See SINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 299. 
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 348. See, e.g., Polanski v. Eagle Point, 141 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Wis. 1966) (“Where it is 
admitted that the present possession is the result of a conveyance by a former owner, it is 
obvious that there will be no forcible entry.  However, the occupation of property pursuant to 
a deed is presumptively and in fact an act adverse to and in derogation of the former owner’s 
title.”). 
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adverse possession claims in color of title cases.349  They thereby perceive 
the special rule for color of title claims as impossible to square with adverse 
possession’s normal hostility requirement.  The law’s promotion of claims 
under color of title thus flies in the face of adverse possession’s two key 
requirements:  that a claimant possess the contested land and do so adversely. 
This perceived conflict between color of title and adverse possession’s 
basic principles disappears once adverse possession’s function is illuminated.  
The doctrine, as we saw, is meant to replace the central clearinghouse for 
land transfers—a registry—that American states have forgone.  Elsewhere in 
the world, the central registry dictates and enforces a uniform system for 
transfers.  That system assures transfers’ standardization and reliability.  Part 
II.C showed that in the United States, adverse possession treats one infirmity 
the lack of such enforced uniformity generates:  the unreliable boundaries 
deeds may establish.350  But the harms generated by the absence of a central 
registry assuring that all transfers abide by clear rules are not limited to faulty 
boundaries.  With no central policing agency, other potential defects in 
documents transferring land are fated:  missing signatures, unfollowed 
procedures, etc. 
Just as the typical application of the adverse possession doctrine treats the 
problem of defective boundaries in deeds, the color of title rule aims to 
address these other defects.351  The color of title doctrine actually requires 
for its application that boundaries in the defective deed be clear.352  The color 
of title doctrine thereby specifically targets other, non-boundary-related 
cases where our transfer system fails:  mainly those where technical mistakes 
cloud an apparent owner’s right to convey the land. 
Because the color of title rule does not specifically tackle the problem of 
faulty boundaries but rather tackles other problems our flawed transfer 
system generates, it need not rely on the tools for ascertaining boundaries 
employed in the normal adverse possession case—which, as noted, is all 
about faulty boundaries.  Namely, it need not resort to the reality on the 
ground (actual possession) and insist on the existence of a real dispute 
(hostility).  While these elements can provide guidance for settling boundary 
disputes that the imperfections of the deed recording system creates, they are 
irrelevant for other disputes to which those imperfections give rise.  For 
treating disputes pertaining to nonboundary defects in deeds that are the 
charge of the color of title rule, no need exists to resort to these tests.   
Thus, despite the fact that its specific doctrinal requirements appear 
misaligned with those of the typical adverse possession claim (namely, its 
wholesale relaxation of the possession and hostility requirements), color of 
title’s animating logic and the function it performs are part and parcel of the 
overall doctrine.  Like regular claims of adverse possession, color of title 
 
 349. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 181 (2021). 
 350. See supra Part II.C. 
 351. Gloyd v. Franck, 154 S.W. 744, 746 (Mo. 1912) (“Ordinarily color of title does not 
apply in boundary disputes.”). 
 352. 4 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY, supra note 203, § 1155. 
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claims fix problems in our registry-less land transfer system.  They just treat 
a factually different type of problem and thus employ different tests. 
B.  Regulating Title Insurance Companies 
The normative need a doctrine answers must inform the manner in which 
it is applied—and hence the preceding section suggested explanations for, 
and adjustments to, judicial interpretations of adverse possession’s 
elements.353  But because the specific need the doctrine of adverse possession 
answers, as identified in Part II, is generated and maintained by a specific 
market actor, the findings should also affect that actor’s regulation.  Adverse 
possession serves as a public subsidy to the title insurance industry, and thus, 
grounds could be found for governmental regulation of that industry.  This 
section will sketch the framework for such regulation.  It will explain why 
the title insurance industry should be viewed as a public utility and which 
elements of public utilities’ regulatory framework should be imported to the 
regulation of this specific industry.  It will also review existing examples of 
state regulation of title insurance. 
The grounds for regulating the title insurance industry lie in the 
characteristics of its business model that render it a vital monopoly.  Title 
insurance is the backbone of the American system for land transactions.  
States have opted to forgo a public system for land transactions, instituting 
instead a system that is in essence private.354  This private option heavily 
relies on (arguably, necessitates) the title insurance product.  Furthermore, in 
practice, even if an individual buyer were willing to transact without 
insurance, she could not, because lenders require insurance.355  Title 
insurance companies thus provide a service on which all those transacting in 
land depend.  As a treatise concludes, “the title insurance company’s office 
frequently is the nucleus for the entire real property transaction.”356 
The number of such service providers that can exist is limited.  To provide 
the service, a title insurance company compiles its own version of the public 
records, called a “title plant,” which efficiently organizes information about 
all lands in the state.357  The resultant plants are vast and highly accurate title 
databases, which often surpass in completeness and quality the governmental 
records.358  Once created, these are cheap to maintain and produce a very 
high return:  each consecutive policy issued requires no additional research 
beyond that done for the earlier sale of the lot, and yet for each sale the new 
buyer pays a full premium.359  Theoretically, if the same lot is sold daily, full 
payment can be charged to each daily buyer, although no additional work—
 
 353. See supra Part III.B. 
 354. See supra Parts II.B–C. 
 355. Melynda Dovel Wilcox, Home Buyers Beware, KIPLINGER’S, Oct. 2001, at 97. 
 356. 1 TITLE INSURANCE LAW § 1:3 (Joyce Palomar ed., 2020). 
 357. McCaffree Fin. Corp. v. Nunnink, 847 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993). 
 358. 14 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 335, § 83.01. 
 359. Barnet, supra note 250, at 13–14. 
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beyond the original research of the lot that went into the firm’s database—is 
necessary.360 
Contrast this profitable standing of an existing title firm to a new one’s 
predicament.  A new entrant into the title insurance market would be hard 
pressed to create its own plant:  before issuing one policy, it will have to 
spend enormous resources investigating each lot.  Consequently, it will have 
to charge potential buyers high premiums, while the existing firms can lower 
their fees (because they now need to invest very little in research preceding 
the policy’s issuance).  The barriers confronting new entrants to the title 
insurance market are, therefore, very high.361 
The result is that the market is highly concentrated in a few firms.  Four 
large players accounted for 87.7 percent of total industry revenue in 2018.362  
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has in the past charged these 
companies for price-fixing.363  Even after that complaint, the companies have 
not been competing on price.364  Explaining, at another time, its objection to 
an industry merger, the FTC observed, “[t]here are no commercially 
reasonable substitutes for title plant services.”365  The Iowa Supreme Court 
also noted, in a different context, the “oligopolistic nature of the industry.”366 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether breaking up the title insurance oligopoly 
would be socially beneficial.  The creation of multiple title plants all covering 
the same land is wasteful.  Each must contain full and identical information 
(otherwise it will be useless to buyers) and thus any new insurance company 
will spend funds on duplicating work already done.367  As is the case with 
other infrastructures—for example, the transportation infrastructure of 
railroads or the power infrastructure of electricity providers—having only 
one underlying infrastructure describing land boundaries is desirable.  The 
title insurance plant is what is often referred to as a natural monopoly.368 
The two traits of title insurance just reviewed—an industry vital for the 
public interest with the characteristics of a monopoly, perhaps a natural 
monopoly—render it analogous to the traditional industries American law 
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views as “public utilities.”369  Perhaps counterintuitively, title insurance is 
much more similar to electricity and telecom—and the original utility, 
railroads—than to other insurance products.370  The reflexive move to treat 
title insurance as the law treats other insurance services is misguided:  unlike 
the latter, the title insurance industry’s key characteristic is not its assumption 
of risk.371  A fire or car insurance company, when issuing a policy to an 
individual, cannot do research to verify that the house will never burn or the 
car will never have an accident.  The company takes on that risk.  Conversely, 
the title insurance policy is only issued after the company has researched the 
land and verified the absence of any risk of mistake.372  The company takes 
on very little, if any, risk (accordingly the policy, unlike normal insurance 
policies, is not priced to reflect the risk of payout—but as a fixed percentage 
of the purchase price).  Perhaps consequently, the title insurance industry has 
to contend with very few claims for losses.373  The Iowa court noted evidence 
indicating an industry loss ratio of 0 percent.374  Accordingly, the focus of 
the industry’s public regulation, unlike the public regulation of other 
insurance industries, need not be verifying that title insurance does not 
assume unsustainable risks thereby threatening insurers’ solvency (and the 
attendant ability to pay out claims).375  Rather, the focus must be on title 
insurance’s function as an indispensable market infrastructure, as in the case 
of the typical public utility. 
Public utilities, traditionally, are regulated to assure that they provide the 
same quality service to all market actors.376  The state dictates the service’s 
quality and mandates that the utility serve identically all potential clients.  For 
title insurance companies, this would mean policing the risks a policy 
protects buyers against.377  It could also entail barring the company from 
discriminating between buyers.  For example, the company could be 
prohibited from providing better services to buyers who commit to work with 
a certain bank (whose financial interest the insurance company otherwise 
wishes to promote).378 
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Beyond service provision regulation, an even more intrusive element of 
traditional public utility regulation is rate setting.379  A utility, for example a 
power company, provides a vital service and lacks true competition, so the 
free market would allow it to charge almost any price.  Because exorbitant 
pricing could debilitate other economic activities relying on the utility, the 
state limits the utility’s prices to a reasonable return.380  If title insurance is 
treated like a utility, a state entity should set title insurance’s policy rates. 
A handful of examples for title insurance companies’ regulation along the 
suggested lines can already be found.  Some aspects of the service provision 
are at times regulated.  In almost all states, companies are subject to reporting 
obligations.381  A majority of states review the quality of at least some of the 
processes preceding a title insurance policy’s issuance (for example, the title 
search).382  A small number of states limit title insurance companies’ power 
to affiliate with mortgage companies, since these often refer a home buyer to 
a title insurance company.383  Price regulation is rarer still.  In most states, 
title insurance companies must report the rates they charge, and seventeen 
states subject rates to approval.384  However, the typical approval standard is 
rather lax, focusing mostly on assuring that rates are not discriminatory.385  
Only Florida,386 New Mexico,387 and Texas388 empower public bodies to 
promulgate title insurance rates. 
The most radical measure for state control of the title insurance industry is 
adhered to in Iowa.  Since 1947, Iowa law has prohibited title insurance.389  
Instead, a state entity has been established that issues a title guarantee policy 
offering land buyers the same coverage as private title insurance.390  This 
public replacement of the private industry functions extremely well.  The 
premiums the state charges for the guarantee are a fraction of the premiums 
private title insurance charges elsewhere,391 and Iowa’s title system is 
considered the country’s most accurate.392 
This Article’s findings should serve to press a greater number of states to 
adopt the more active forms of title insurance regulation reviewed here.  As 
established in Part II, the general public subsidizes title insurance companies, 
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not only through the premiums it must pay but also through its subjugation 
to a suboptimal boundary management system with the attendant costs of 
adverse possession.  Iowa’s choice to replace the private industry with a 
public service is wholly justified.  A service sustained through legal doctrines 
alone should not generate limitless fruits for a parasitic private industry.393  
Other states might find the Iowa route of abolishing private power in the field 
too radical, but they should at least consider controlling such power’s 
expansion.  The recording system that necessitates the doctrine of adverse 
possession aids title insurance companies in maintaining their stranglehold 
on the market for managing land transactions.394  They should not be allowed 
to leverage this public subsidy to further strengthen their position in adjacent 
markets, such as the mortgages market.  Limits on title insurance companies’ 
affiliation with mortgage companies and other actors in the real estate market 
are thus clearly called for.  Perhaps more urgently than any such structural 
reform, all states should proceed to follow the three that set title insurance 
rates.  Arguments that reject rate regulation in this case are incoherent once 
we see the industry as a natural monopoly—one on which citizens must rely 
because of the absence of effective state laws for boundary determination.395 
One could argue, given this Article’s findings respecting adverse 
possession, that no form of title insurance industry regulation would be far-
reaching enough.  Reform must be more drastic.  Already, some have argued 
that the true regulatory solution for our wasteful system of land management 
is switching to the Torrens system.396  However, such sweeping reform is 
highly improbable.397  Consequently, as a second-best solution, states should 
more effectively regulate the private industry replacing the registration 
system. 
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CONCLUSION 
Most observers—whether lawyers, scholars, law students, or laypeople—
consider adverse possession an anomaly and for good reason.  As all realize, 
the doctrine contradicts both common intuitions of justice and core property 
law premises.  Writers have been able to provide some justification for this 
anomaly, explaining in different ways why adverse possession is actually an 
inevitable product of property law theories and thus serves core legal 
principles.  This Article questions that move.  It shows that as an exception 
to the prevailing property regime, adverse possession is not truly in line with 
property law theories—and thus, as an anomaly, it is perhaps even more 
troubling than assumed before.  The theories animating property law do not 
need adverse possession; the ineffective American system for managing 
boundaries, and the industry benefiting from its dysfunction, do.  Economic 
interests, not philosophical principles, have constructed a land management 
system in the United States that necessitates the doctrine.  We should 
understand, apply, and interpret adverse possession as such:  a practical tool 
our imperfect land system needs as long as we insist, probably against our 
own best interests, on keeping that system imperfect. 
 
